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Abstract 
Merging companies typically anticipate inventory reductions through pooling of inventory, higher 
purchasing power or elimination of planning uncertainties in a wider supply chain. In contrasts, 
companies appear to experience an inventory build-up in the quarters after an acquisition. This is 
the first attempt that I am aware of to develop an understanding for when, how and why the inven-
tory build-up occurs. The research gap is addressed in this work with four research questions.                      
(1) Does the phenomenon of inventory build-ups after mergers exists? (2) When does the inventory 
build-up occur and does it persist after the post-merger integration? (3) What happens in the post-
merger integration and why does the inventory build-up occur? (4) Which companies are affected 
the most by the inventory build-up? 
Creating awareness and understanding of the inventory build-up is important because companies 
may take wrong assumptions when deciding on their next acquisition. The additional inventory po-
sitions constitutes an implicit premium to the deal value. Unrealistic expectations in the inventory 
development can affect post-merger integration when companies focus on the wrong actions.  
Therefore, decision makers should have well founded reasons when they anticipate inventory re-
ductions. 
 
The research gap is addressed in this work with four research questions, based on data comprising 
926 U.S. mergers in the period 1978-2009. Financial data for four quarters before and eight quarters 
after the merger is retrieved from Standard & Poor's Compustat database.  
I compare average inventory levels before and after the merger to show a substantial increase in 
inventory levels. A more detailed analysis of quarterly inventory growth rates shows when the in-
ventory build-up occurs. Inventory responsiveness is used as a measure that reflects inventory 
growth adjusted for revenue growth. For a sub-sample of 58 deals, I decompose inventory into raw 
material, work in progress and finished goods. I use a least square dummy variable regression to 
show which companies are likely to experience strong inventory build-up. 
 
The results of this study confirm that the inventory build-up exists. Mean inventory levels increase 
by $ 99.4 million or 21.6% in the first year after the merger. The higher inventory levels are not 
reverted in the second year after the merger as mean inventory increases to 35.3% above pre-merger 
level. The inventory build-up happens in the first and second quarter after the merger when inven-
tory growth rates peak at 7.9% and 6.9% respectively. Revenue growth can partially explain the in-
ventory build-up. However, other factors including operational changes in supply and production 
play a role. Companies that typically experience high growth in inventory levels operate in high vol-
ume businesses and target smaller companies for acquisitions. 
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1 Introduction
The belief that M&A creates value is widely accepted. However, most of the created value
is distributed to the target’s shareholders. This leaves the acquirer’s shareholders with
no or only little gains. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) found that mergers in the period
1963-1984 increased the combined stock market valuation of the merging entities by 7.4%
on average. However, the majority of the wealth was allocated through the acquisition
premium to the target’s shareholders. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) found that
in the period 1973-1998, stock market returns for merging companies in the U.S. improved
by 0.4% on average. Again, the target shareholders captured most of the wealth. Other
research suggested that mergers are not able to significantly improve operating perfor-
mance and cast doubt on the ability of mergers to realize synergies (Healy, Palepu and
Ruback (1992), Ghosh (2001), Powell and Stark (2005)). One important conclusion from
the research on M&A synergy creation is that acquiring companies face challenges to sys-
tematically realize synergies beyond the acquisition premium.
Why then do companies engage in M&As? M&A promises the opportunity to quickly
create capabilities that are not available and that can not be created within the company.
Therefore successful mergers are often critical to make a company’s strategy work. But
if these capabilities improve long-term firm performance, why is this not reflected in the
shareholder value of the acquiring firm? This paper is set out to reconcile this seeming
contradiction between low M&A value creation and its vast popularity by arguing that
operational and, in particular, inventory considerations matter. In particular I will argue
that strategic and operational synergies can be outweighed by operational inefficiencies.
These inefficiencies are a product of the ongoing transformation process as the target firm
resources are being integrated into the acquirer’s supply chain. This paper focuses on the
problem of inventory buildup - one of the possible damages that occur upon the merger.
One idea for making M&A more successful comes from supply chain practitioners. Herd,
Saksena and Steger (2005), Finley and Bonno (2012), and Tompkins (2012) promoted the
idea that the supply chain involvement is essential for M&A success. In many cases supply
chain was the largest source of cost synergies, accounting for up to 30-50% of the total
cost savings. Acquiring companies are likely to overpay when they estimate the synergy
potential too high. However, accurate estimation of the synergy potential requires the
understanding of subject matter experts. For instance, the consolidation of distribution
networks is often identified as a saving potential in a merger with geographical overlap.
However, individual distribution centers may be critical in ensuring service levels and fast
delivery. Their close-downs may result in loss of customers that are not willing to wait
for their delivery.
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Supply chain management is critical to make the deal work in the post-merger integration.
The consolidation of production and logistics facilities often necessitates asset transfers
and changes in the layout of facilities. Supply chain experts are essential to manage the
transition and avoid operational disruptions. Disruptions in customer deliveries can be
especially severe during the post-merger integration when customers are already concerned
that their needs may be compromised in the pressure to realize cost synergies. The first
100 days often entail the biggest decisions, as the uncertainty in the merging organizations
creates a window of opportunity for change. To make the right decisions concerning the
supply chain and to get the realization of supply chain synergies on the right track,
key people need to understand the deal rationale and plan for the future supply chain
before the implementation starts. Therefore, early involvement of supply chain experts is
essential for merger success.
In practice, however, supply chain management receives little to no attention during pre-
deal strategy decisions, deal making and planning of the new organization. Only in the
post-merger integration, the supply chain gains importance as it is expected to deliver
synergies that often represent a significant share of the total synergies.
The supply chain perspective on M&A is a vivid part of the discussion among supply
chain experts and in some M&A deals a key driver for success. In contrast, it has received
little attention in academia. Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) surveyed M&A decision makers and
found that logistics and supply chain topics were perceived to be an important motive and
enabler for synergies. However, studies of supply chain performance in the post-merger
period show that it is often poor. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) analyzed changes in supply
chain performance for horizontal mergers with an event study methodology. They found
that in the year after the merger, the inventory period became longer, gross margin on
inventory decreased and inventory grew faster than did revenue. Similar observations
were made by Langabeer (2003) who found deteriorating supply chain performance in a
sample of 400 mergers in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Saraan and Srai
(2008) and Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) employed case studies as an alter-
native research approach. Their aim was to illustrate frequent post-merger activities to
capture operational synergies and to highlight the vital role of inventory and supply chain
management in mergers and acquisitions.
An important conclusion from the academic research is that the performance in inventory-
related metrics deteriorates after a merger. This finding is troubling as merging companies
frequently expect net working capital synergies, which include reduction in the inventory
position.
Acquiring companies have good reasons to anticipate such synergies. Anupindi and Bassok
(1999) and Cachon (2003) found the benefits of inventory pooling through combination
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of safety stocks. Merging companies could pool inventory through the consolidation of
warehouses and distribution centers. Economies of scale could lead to more efficient stor-
age and inventory handling practices. Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) and Schweiger and Lippert
(2005) noted that the higher purchasing power of the combined entity could improve the
negotiation position when bargaining on delivery terms with suppliers, such as delivery
lead times or vendor managed inventory. Singh (2009) and Bernile and Lyandres (2010)
analyzed the benefits of vertical mergers. For instance, planning uncertainty and buffer
stocks may be reduced by optimization across a larger supply chain.
The expectation to reduce inventory levels after acquisitions stands in contrasts to obser-
vations of actual inventory development. The key contribution of this study is to clearly
establish that the phenomenon of inventory build-ups following acquisitions exists. This
is the first attempt that I am aware of to develop an understanding for when, how and
why the inventory build-up occurs. The research gap is addressed in this work with four
research questions, based on data comprising 926 U.S. mergers in the period 1978-2009.
(1) Does the phenomenon of inventory build-ups after mergers exists? (2) When does the
inventory build-up occur and does it persist after the post-merger integration? (3) What
happens in the post-merger integration and why does the inventory build-up occur? (4)
Which companies are affected the most by the inventory build-up?
Creating awareness and understanding of the inventory build-up is important because
companies may take wrong assumptions when deciding on their next acquisition. The ad-
ditional inventory positions constitute an implicit premium to the deal value. Unrealistic
expectations in the inventory development can affect post-merger integration when com-
panies focus on the wrong actions. Therefore, decision makers should have well founded
reasons when they anticipate inventory reductions.
The initial list of 3590 deals is retrieved from SDC M&A database. Acquiring and target
company need to be publicly traded and regularly report quarterly financial data including
their inventory position. Financial data for four quarters before and eight quarters after
the merger is retrieved from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. The final sample
includes 926 companies. 499 of the targeted companies are in the high tech manufacturing
industry, 224 in process manufacturing, 144 in trade and 59 in mining and construction.
Companies in the finance, service and transport and utilities industries are not included
in the sample as they do not have relevant inventory positions.
I compare average inventory levels before and after the merger to show a substantial in-
crease in inventory levels. A more detailed analysis of quarterly inventory growth rates
shows when the inventory build-up occurs. Revenue is a main driver for inventory de-
velopment. Extraordinary revenue growth after the acquisition may be an explanation
for the extraordinary inventory growth. I devise inventory responsiveness to measure the
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growth in inventory that exceeds revenue growth. The analysis of quarterly inventory
responsiveness shows in which quarters inventory growth can not be explained by rev-
enue growth. For a sub-sample of 58 deals, more detailed inventory data is available.
The decomposition of inventory may unfold other reasons for the inventory build-up. In-
creasing raw material inventory indicates challenges in transition and change of suppliers.
Changes of work in progress inventory can be caused by an extension of the product
portfolio or creation of new bottlenecks by higher capacity utilization and close-downs.
An increase in finished goods inventory suggests anticipated revenue growth as the goods
need to be made available to the customer. Certain companies are likely to experience
stronger inventory growth after an acquisition. I use a least square dummy variable re-
gression to assess the correlation of inventory build-up and company characteristics. The
dependent variables is measured through inventory growth after post-merger acquisitions
and through inventory growth adjusted for revenue growth. The company characteristics
include gross margin, inventory turnover, capital intensity, acquirer and target size.
The results of this study confirm that the inventory build-up exists. Mean inventory levels
increase by $ 99.4 million or 21.6% in the first year after the merger. The higher inventory
levels are not reverted in the second year after the merger as mean inventory increases
to 35.3% above pre-merger level. The inventory build-up happens in the first and second
quarter after the merger when inventory growth rates peak up to 7.9% and 6.9% respec-
tively. The difference to long-term average growth rate at 4.1% is statistically significant.
Revenue growth is part of the explanation for the inventory build-up. Revenue growth
can account for inventory growth in the second quarter after the merger. However, in
the first quarter inventory growth of 7.9% is significantly higher than revenue growth of
-0.8%. The decomposition of inventory indicates that operational changes in the supply
and production network are part of the explanation of inventory build-ups. Companies
that typically experience high growth in inventory levels operate in high volume busi-
nesses and target smaller companies for acquisitions.
The first research question seeks to confirm that the phenomenon of inventory build-ups
after mergers exists. The comparison of mean inventory levels shows an increase from
$837.9 million in the four quarters before the merger to $937.3 million in the four quar-
ters following the merger. The increase of $99.4 million corresponds to a 21.6% increase of
mean pre-acquisition inventory and is statistically significant. The increase in inventory
levels persists in the second year after the merger. The mean inventory level lies at $993.3
million, which is $155.5 million above pre-merger average. These results confirm that
inventory levels increase significantly after mergers. Moreover, the increase is persistent
over time which indicates that it is caused by fundamental changes in the business rather
than temporary disturbances that may occur during post-merger integration.
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The second research question concerns the timing of the inventory build-up. The average
inventory growth lies at 4.1% per quarter across all firm quarter observations. Inventory
growth rates peak in the first and second quarter at 7.9% and 6.9% respectively. These
averages are significantly different from the long-term average across all quarters. These
findings corroborate that the inventory build-up phenomenon is closely connected to the
post-merger integration. The timing of the inventory build-up goes hand in hand with
the 100 days axiom in post-merger integration described by Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and
Gregory (2010) and Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005). Acquiring companies typically
strove to make key decisions and changes as early as possible to utilize the window of
opportunity for change and to build up momentum for the post-merger integration.
The third research question looks at the reasons behind the change in inventory levels.
Revenue growth and operational changes in supply and production network are main
reasons for the inventory build-up. Increasing sales often means expanding into new
geographic areas, into new customer segments or introducing a new product. All of these
steps are related to creating additional inventory. Merging companies often aim to boost
their sales growth through these or similar actions. I compare inventory and revenue
growth in a metrics called inventory responsiveness (Rumyantsev and Netessine; 2007).
In the first quarter after the merger, revenue growth is at -0.8% and can not explain
inventory growth at 7.9%. However, in the second quarter after the merger, 5.2% revenue
growth is the main driver for inventory growth of 6.9%. Revenue growth is one piece of
the inventory build-up puzzle.
I am able to track changes in specific inventory types for a subsample of my data. I find
that it is work in progress that is strongly affected by M&A activity. For many merging
companies, the acquisition seems to initiate a fundamental change in the operations that
necessitates higher work in progress inventory. For instance, bottlenecks in production
can occur when volumes reach a capacity limit or when close downs reduce the available
capacity as part of the merger. An extension of the product portfolio may require to store
a larger variety of intermediate products. Raw material inventory grows even stronger,
reaching an increase of 13.8% in the first quarter. Although the effect is not statistically
significant, companies seem to face challenges when changing suppliers to gain synergies
or when maintaining relationship with key suppliers. The companies in the sub-sample do
not build-up additional finished goods inventory. Revenue growth is not able to account
for higher inventory levels. This may be due to the small sample size and the nature
of these businesses. As they report detailed inventory decomposition, inventory manage-
ment is likely to be an important part of their business that is also closely followed by
shareholders.
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The fourth research question examines which companies are likely to experience higher in-
ventory growth. The regression analysis exhibits that companies that operate in high vol-
ume businesses and target smaller companies for acquisitions typically experience higher
inventory build-ups.
Inventory build-up is negatively correlated to the size of the target company at statistically
significant levels. When choosing a 50% larger target, acquiring companies can expect a
0.3%-points smaller cumulative average growth rate of inventory in the first year after the
merger. For the median company holding $ 837.9 million in inventory before the merger,
this implies $ 2.5 million lower inventory build-up. Smaller targets are likely to receive
less management attention as their impact tends to be smaller. The integration may be
carried out with less rigor and control leading to a higher inventory build-up.
Companies that typically experience high growth in inventory levels operate in high vol-
ume businesses. Inventory turnover is positively correlated with inventory build-up with
a coefficient of 0.30. Inventory turnover is a measure of efficiency with higher values sig-
nifying the ability to produce more at same inventory levels or to produce same levels
with a lower inventory position. Higher efficiency implies higher inventory growth. For
instance, an increase in quarterly inventory turnover from 2.3 to 2.5 is associated with an
additional inventory build-up by 0.2% or $ 1.9 million for an average company.
After looking at the relationship between inventory growth and M&A, I study the link
between inventory responsiveness and M&A. The dependent variable is replaced by a mea-
sure of inventory growth adjusted for revenue growth. Target size and inventory turnover
are not significant explanatory variables in these regressions. However, acquirer size ex-
hibits a negative and statistically significant relation. Larger acquiring companies appear
to have superior capabilities and resources to manage and integrate their acquisitions.
Companies in the retail and wholesales industries experience above average inventory
build-ups. I presume that trade companies have stronger incentives to ensure customer
deliveries and therefore choose to hold additional inventory. This is because trade com-
panies operate closer to the end customer who may have better possibilities and lower
barriers to switch to competitors when delivery performance declines as a result of post-
merger integration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the
existing literature. It consists of three subsections comprising event study analyses of
post-acquisition inventory metrics, surveys and case studies on supply chain perspective
in M&A, and studies that involve mathematical programming. Section 3 develops the
hypotheses to address the four research questions. Section 4 describes the data and
methodology. Section 5 analyses the empirical results and compares them to earlier
studies. Section 6 concludes the main findings, practical implications and provides ideas
for future research.
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2 Literature review
Despite the extensive research on M&A (Tuch and O’Sullivan; 2007), there is little liter-
ature that analyses changes in inventory and inventory related topics under the supply
chain or operations research. In recent years, the supply chain aspects in M&A has gained
interest among researchers and the following paragraphs introduce the relevant literature.
The first sub-section of the literature review contains three articles that employ empirical
analysis to assess changes in inventory based performance metrics. The second section
aims to provide a broader view on operations and supply chain functions and their role
in M&A. The third section gives a view on a related research stream in operations man-
agement. Theoretical studies use mathematical programming models to assess synergy
potential in the combination of supply chains.
2.1 Event study analyses of post-acquisition inventory metrics
Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) examined the change of inventory based supply chain metrics
in horizontal mergers between 1997-2006. Their analysis did not show improved perfor-
mance when comparing pre- and post-merger performance for the average company, but
rather deteriorating performance in several areas: The inventory period of the median
company increased by 2%, indicating that the merged company operated less efficiently.
The gross profit return on inventory decreased, meaning that the companies earned less
profit for each dollar invested to inventory. Inventory levels of the median company in-
creased by 12% while sales grew only by 9%, meaning that the merging companies needed
to stock up additional inventory. This development persisted in the second year after
the merger: Inventory was 20% higher than prior to the acquisition and revenue growth
lacked behind at 17%. The inventory growth effect in the first and in the second year were
found to be significantly different from zero at the 1% level when performing a Wilcoxon
sign rank test for differences in medians. For the second year, the difference of inventory
growth and revenue growth (denoted as inventory responsiveness) was 2%-points which
was statistically significant at the 5% level.
The authors retrieved a sample of 487 U.S. deals from the SDC M&A database for which
financial data were available on a quarterly basis. Quarterly financial data was retrieved
from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database to compare median average performance in
the four quarters before to four quarters after the merger. The change in performance
could be driven by industry trends. To account for the potential effect, the authors
benchmarked the merging firm with the industry average and with their closest rival firm.
Industry averages were calculated as medians from a industry classification based on three
digit SIC codes (Standard Industry Identifier). Merging firms grew inventory levels by 12%
from the year before to the year after the merger. In comparison, the industry adjusted
inventory growth was evaluated at -15% meaning that the industry median company grows
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inventory 15% faster than the merging company. The authors analyzed that the merging
firms were able to operate their inventory more efficiently. However, merging companies
were not able to translate the efficiency into profit. Gross margin returns on inventory were
clearly below the industry median level. The authors acknowledged that the difference
could be driven by differences in company size. An alternative matching procedure for
rival performance took company size into consideration in addition to industry. Rival
adjusted inventory growth was 3%. Thus the rival firm grew inventory 3% slower than
the merging firm. That translated into better inventory turnovers for the rival adjusted
firms, as they had more efficient inventory practices. The authors suggested that rival
firms were able to gain a competitive advantage when their closest competitors go through
a merger.
In the further analysis, Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) grouped their sample according to the
change in return on assets (∆ROA) to create a sub-sample for the quarter of companies
with the highest increase in ∆ROA. This sub-sample of merging firms was able to increase
the inventory turnover and improve the gross margin earned on inventory investments.
To analyze the effect of supply chain performance on profitability in a merger, the authors
conducted a regression analysis. They employed a number of operational metrics: ∆GPM
(gross profit margin), ∆SOA (sales on assets), ∆IP (inventory over cost of goods sold) and
∆INV (inventory). By regress them on the dependent variable ∆ROA, the authors found
significant, positive relationships for all variables. While the regression can not identify
causalities, it potentially suffers from multi-collinearity. The explanatory variables are
derived from a small set of financial metrics including multiple times sales, costs of goods,
and inventory.
The paper is a good starting point to shed light into post-acquisition inventory perfor-
mance as the authors identify deteriorating inventory performance. However, the authors
dilute the message by packaging the analysis in metrics derived from actual inventory
levels and venturing into a quest for synergy gains.
Langabeer (2003) found that mergers led to lower supply chain performance after the
merger. The research focused on companies in the pharmaceutical and chemical compa-
nies (SIC code 2800-2899) that conducted mergers between 1990-2000. This time period
was characterized by high merger activity in the respective industry. The sample included
400 deals from the SDC mergers and acquisition database. Financial data for the years
before and after the merger year were retrieved from Lexis-Nexis. To deepen the analysis
beyond financial metrics, supply chain data was retrieved from Hoovers database. The
data included the number of shipments for each company: The total number of shipments
in the industry was split to the companies in the sample according to a company’s relative
share of revenue. The authors make the underlying assumption that the size and value of
shipments are similar across the industry. However, companies can split their deliveries
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into smaller batches to create a competitive advantage through superior delivery perfor-
mance. The authors employed factor analysis to construct one metric for supply chain
performance that comprises inventory turns, finished goods inventory level and operating
margin. Pre-merger supply chain performance lay at 0.23 and deteriorated to 0.01. The
difference in means was found to be statistically significant at the 5% level.
In the further analysis, deal value was used as a proxy for merger volume and intensity.
Higher deal values were found to be negatively correlated with post-merger supply chain
performance. Inventory turns per year, operating margin, capacity utilization and num-
ber of employees per shipment decrease for higher deal values. And costs per shipment
and finished goods inventory increased with the deal value. Overall, the analysis showed
that higher deal values tend to result in lower post-merger supply chain performance.
In a subsequent paper, Langabeer and Seifert (2003) analyzed the relationship of post-
merger integration and profitability. Although, the article misses a sufficient description
of the employed data and methodologies, it is quoted in the relating literature and there-
fore the findings are reviewed briefly in the following. Supply chain performance was
measured by a similar set of metrics including inventory levels, inventory turnover, cost
per shipment and employees per shipment as a proxy for labor productivity. The au-
thors chose return on assets and operating margin as measures for merger success. An
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis showed that lower inventory levels and
higher inventory turns were associated with better financial performance. In addition,
the authors developed a proxy for the speed at which a company could complete the
integration process. Companies that were able to integrate faster, were found to perform
better in financial terms and the ones that spent two and more years on the integration
had negative operating margins. The authors concluded for M&A to be a questionable
value creation strategy because the supply chain and financial performance were likely to
deteriorate after the merger.
Langabeer and Seifert (2003) saw the underlying reason for deteriorating supply chain
performance in the separated responsibilities in the pre- and post-merger phases. The
pre-merger planning, assessing and negotiating was dominated by finance and planning
groups. However, operations and supply chain were expected to execute the deal on an
operational level. During the integration, substantial challenges occurred that were not
accounted for in the merger planning and that could put the merger success at stakes.
The authors employed case studies and anecdotal evidence to support their claim. For
instance, they cited the acquisition of Robson Foods by Colonel Foods. The acquirer
failed to integrate the supply chains due to distinctively different strategic focus: Colonel
Foods pursued a low cost strategy with control of its own warehouses, truck fleet and
logistic department which allowed the company to pursue a low cost strategy. In con-
trast, Robson Foods had outsourced the entire logistics focusing its efforts on a premium
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product offering. The failure to integrate the supply chains contributed to the resolution
of the merger after 1.5 years and led to the resignation of the vice president logistics. The
authors concluded that early and active involvement of supply chain representatives was
the key to a fast and successful merger integration.
An key insight from the existing event study research is that inventory levels appear to
increase significantly after an acquisition. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) employed metrics
for supply chain performance that were based on inventory levels. Average inventory lev-
els increased by 12% from the year before to the year after the merger. Langabeer (2003)
found declining performance for a supply chain measure that combined into one metric
inventory turns, finished goods inventory level, and operating margin. However, the con-
tribution to the understanding of the inventory build-up is very limited. Langabeer (2003)
investigated the relationship of deal values and post-merger supply chain performance and
found it to be negatively correlated. Larger target companies appear to be more difficult
to integrate.
Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) and Langabeer and Seifert (2003) made an effort to link
supply chain performance to financial performance and overall merger success. Such
a relationship is appealing. Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005), D’Avanzo, Lewinski and
Wassenhove (2003) and Finley and Bonno (2012) promoted the idea that strong and early
supply chain involvement was critical for merger success. However, the provided evidence
may not be sufficient. The analysis in both papers was based on regression analysis which
may indicate correlation but not causality.
2.2 Surveys and case studies on supply chain perspective in
M&A
The event studies introduced in the previous section are limited in creating insights for
the reasons of change and into the decision making process. Alternative research designs
such as surveys and case studies can provide a deeper understanding and develop guidance
for inventory development after an acquisition. The following paragraphs introduce the
relevant literature.
Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) surveyed key decision makers of 257 Finnish and Swedish manu-
facturing companies. The authors found that logistic was perceived to play an important
role in M&A: Logistics was considered an important motive for M&A and a key enabler
to achieve other motives. The sample of deals between 1995-2001 was drawn from website
information from KPMG Sweden and the Finnish business magazine Talouselama. Ques-
tionnaires were send out to the management of 257 acquiring companies, which in total
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conducted 484 deals in the period. The response rate was 12%. The authors analyzed
synergy potential and realization across corporate functions including sourcing, manufac-
turing, distribution as well as sales, R&D, IT, administration and finance. The scope of
logistics included sourcing, manufacturing and distribution areas. The authors employed
Spearman rank order correlations to link survey results with deal characteristics. 40% of
the survey respondents regarded logistic synergies as an extremely important or impor-
tant merger motive. Logistics synergies were rated third after product/ market extension
and geographical extension. Realizing logistics synergies was perceived as neither difficult
nor easy by most respondents, although logistic synergies appeared to be harder to realize
than synergies in finance, administration or IT.
The hypothesis that capturing synergies was easier for smaller targets is not supported. No
significant effects were found. On the contrary, realizing synergies in sourcing was found to
be more difficult for smaller targets. The absolute synergy potential was lower for smaller
targets, thus attracting less management attention. The lack of management attention
could result in too little effort and support being put into integration. Higher expected
synergies led to higher levels of integration in distribution, sales, R&D. For distribution the
relationship was statistically significant. A high level of expected synergies in distribution
had strong, positive relationships with the degree of the integration in all other functions
except finance. Realizing distribution synergies often involved the reorganization of the
distribution network which entailed an integrated effort from all functions. The analysis
showed that closer levels of integration increased the chances to realize synergies. This
finding held for most functions, but also applied across functions. In particular, realizing
synergies in manufacturing became easier with a higher degree of integration in IT, R&D
and finance.
The authors introduced a basic framework for structuring and illustrating logistic issues
in an acquisition. The framework started from impacting factors including similarities,
complementaries, geographical overlaps, relative size, pre-merger quality of process, and
acquirers experience. The factors were used to assess logistic structures and processes in
sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution. While the authors highlighted the multiple
use cases of the framework in evaluating combination potential, levels of integration or
realized synergies, the actual process for evaluation remained open.
Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) proposed a basic framework for an operations
management perspective on M&A. The framework was called operations process maps
and aimed to illustrate frequent post-merger activities to capture operational synergies.
From operations perspective, the principal stages in M&A were identification of value
creation drivers, initial operations assessment, development of operations strategy and
value delivery. The authors observed a research gap regarding the operational activities
in synergy realization. The research was based on the insights from 24 case studies and
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refined in interviews with executives and industry experts.
In the operations process map, identification of value creation drivers was based on strate-
gic objectives and led to the selection and review of potential target companies. The
outcomes of the initial operations assessment was compared to strategic objectives and
value creation drivers. For promising targets, assessment proceeded to the development of
an operations strategy. The components of an operations strategy included value delivery
plan, risk management, and formal due diligence. If the assessment was successful, the
acquisition proceeded to negotiation and eventually to execution. The negotiation phase
was used to set up an implementation plan and team. During the execution, the value
delivery plan was implemented sequenced to the first 100 days, the first year and the tran-
sition to business as usual after about three years. The authors emphasized the generic
nature of the framework as it applied to all observed M&A cases. The starting point for
the involvement of different stakeholders and the time lines of phases were omitted as
they were typically extremely case sensitive.
The operations process map lay down the generic process for value creation through op-
erational synergies. The first phase aimed at identification of value creation drivers and
was studied in a related paper by Bertoncelj and Kovacˇ (2007). The fourth phase con-
cerning value delivery and frequent activities were analyzed by Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and
Gregory (2010) and Saraan and Srai (2008). Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010)
highlighted the need for further research on phase 2 and 3 which comprise the initial
operations assessment and operations strategy.
Bertoncelj and Kovacˇ (2007) analyzed a subsample of 9 M&A cases and introduced hard
and soft key success factors for value contribution in M&A. While each factor contributed
by its own, the key to more successful acquisitions was taking a balanced approach that
incorporates all factors at an early stage. In particular, the authors argued that except
for the competent management team, the soft success factors were frequently neglected.
The lack in attention towards organizational learning, intellectual capital, a joint organi-
zational culture, and effective communication resulted in the neglect of human aspect and
ultimately in the failure of many deals. Hard success factors were thorough acquisition
research and due diligence, sufficient financial resources, realistic synergy estimates, and
accurate integration planning. They represented the financial side of M&A. Managers
often focused on the financial factors and the deal went off track when the soft factors did
not match. The authors suggested that all factors should be considered in an early stage
of the merger process.
Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) investigated the value delivery for different
M&A motives and for actions taken towards value realization. The most frequent motives
were improved network access including market, product and technology, and improved
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network efficiency in supply, production and route to market. Contrary to the authors
expectations, the taken actions did not depend on the underlying motive. A possible
explanation was the multitude of motives typically at play in an acquisition. The most
frequent actions in purchasing included supplier re-selection, harmonization of specifica-
tions and purchasing policies. For an individual factory typical actions comprised changes
in outsourcing, production line redeployment, know-how transfer and equipment invest-
ments for production task changes and for technology upgrades. Frequent changes in the
production network concerned production tasks and geographic dispersion. Many M&A
cases included actions changing the route to market with the aim to exploit of joint dis-
tribution channels, change in inventory policies, and rationalization of warehousing and
distribution.
Saraan and Srai (2008) used a subsample of five case studies to develop and introduce
a framework and determine the sequence of actions. The significance and sequence of
operational actions depended on geographic and product overlaps among the merging
companies. For instance, mergers with a regional but with no product overlap typically
focused on customer service within the first 100 days and then started exploiting market
access opportunities and integration of business processes. Long-term action to should
be completed within three years were the integration of distribution, sales and service
network. In contrast, M&A integration with a product but without a geographic over-
lap would start by assessing the manufacturing technology and processes. The first year
focused on planning the integration, reviewing opportunities for outsourcing and integra-
tion of product development. Long-term actions were the integration of manufacturing
technologies, best practice transfers in production and group-wide material planning. For
cases of geographic and product overlap, the authors suggested for the first year to de-
termine a procurement strategy and capacity planning across all sites. Long-term actions
were the realization of economies of scale in procurement and production, rationalization
of production networks and the ERP integration.
Summarizing, the surveys and case studies showed that supply chain was perceived as an
important factor in M&A and in particular in post-merger integration. However, in many
deals the role of supply chain management is neglected. Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) and Srai,
Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) identified the research gap and initiated the devel-
opment of supply chain and operational frameworks. The frameworks have proven useful
in delivering insights into what happens in the supply chain during post-merger integra-
tion. Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) identified interdependencies among integration and synergy
realization in different departments. Closer levels of integration increased the chances of
synergy realization within and across different functions. Realizing synergies in manufac-
turing became easier with a higher degree of integration in IT, R&D and finance. Srai,
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Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) highlighted the importance of the first 100 days in
post-merger integration which is a central element in the argument for earlier supply chain
involvement in deal making. The authors found that the actions to integrate operations
of the merging companies did not depend on the merger motive. However, Saraan and
Srai (2008) showed that the significance and sequence of operational actions depended on
geographic and product overlaps among the merging companies.
2.3 Studies that involve mathematical programming
Mathematical programming models represent a related research stream from operations
research. Research in this area typically aims to solve theoretical optimization problems
through linear programming. Some scholars employed mathematical models to quantify
supply chain synergies in various M&A settings. These studies may be helpful in de-
termining the synergy potential of individual merger cases. Accurate estimates of the
synergy potential are important to avoid overpaying on the deal premium and to set
the right focus areas in post-merger integration. However, this study aims to establish
whether companies actually manage to realize synergies. Therefore, the research stream
focused on mathematical programming in reviewed only briefly.
Xu (2007) pointed out synergies form consolidating supply chains as a major motive for
the recent merger wave in the 2000s. As the realization of these synergies proved to be
challenging in practice, the author developed mathematical programming models to es-
timate and analyze synergies from supply chain consolidation. The multi-period model
varied the fit of company characteristics like product structure and distribution network
and estimates improvements in supply chain performance of the merged company. The
analysis showed that most synergies originated from lower logistic costs through reduc-
tions in the number of trucks. Achieving the full synergy potential required the supply
chain manager to work with short planning horizons.
Nagurney (2009) proposed a model to quantify potential operational synergies from a
horizontal merger. The model was novel in embedding the company into a network of
other companies. In the network, manufacturing, distribution and logistics functions of
acquirer and target company could be modeled as one system. This facilitated a better
understanding of the interaction of the company characteristics in each function and al-
lowed assessing the impact on operational synergies. Mathematical programming models
helped to properly assess potential supply chain synergies prior to the merger.
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3 Hypotheses
In the following section, I introduce five hypotheses and their underlying reasoning. The
first research question concerns the existence of the inventory build-up phenomenon and
is addressed in hypothesis 1. For the second research question, the timing of the inventory
build-up is analyzed in hypothesis 2. The third research question looks at reasons for the
inventory build-up. Hypothesis 3 looks at revenue as a driver of inventory. For hypothesis
4, I decompose inventory into raw material, work in progress and finished goods to identify
underlying drivers of inventory growth. The fourth research question investigates which
type of company is more likely to experience high inventory growth after mergers. Hy-
pothesis 5 evaluates the relationship of five company characteristics to inventory build-up.
An important insight from the literature review in section 2.1 is that inventory levels ap-
pear to increase significantly after an acquisition. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) employed
metrics for supply chain performance that were based on inventory levels. Average inven-
tory levels increased by 12% from the year before to the year after the merger. Langabeer
(2003) found declining performance for a supply chain measure that combined into one
metric inventory turns, finished goods inventory level, and operating margin. The first
steps is to establish clearly that the phenomenon of increasing inventory levels exists.
Hypothesis 1. Post-acquisition inventory is significantly higher than pre-acquisition in-
ventory.
The second research question deals with the timing of the inventory build-up. Most merger
execution activities are completed within the second year after the merger. Srai, Berton-
celj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) described three phases in post-merger integration. The
most important decisions are taken withing the first 100 days after the merger announce-
ment. In the first year, the value delivery occurs. In the last step, operations return
to business as usual. Recent research by Langabeer (2003) and Zhu, Boyaci and Ray
(2011) followed post-merger performance for one and two years respectively. Post-merger
integration often involves fundamental changes in the way the two companies operate.
Finley and Bonno (2012) and Srai et al. (2010) described restructuring of production and
distribution footprint, re-allocation of production, creation of shared services and consol-
idation of inbound and outbound logistics as typical changes. I claim that these changes
can create a need for higher inventory levels. For instance, a close-down of production
facilities aims to increase capacity utilization which may create bottlenecks in production
and logistics that result in higher inventory positions. Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishna-
murthy (2009) and Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) showed that revenue synergies are a common
motive for mergers. I argue that revenue growth is likely to necessitate inventory growth.
For instance, this is the case when the acquiring company makes the target company’s
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products available through its distribution channel to boost sales. For these reasons, I
expect the inventory build-up to persist beyond the post-merger integration.
An alternative argumentation is that temporary inventory buffers are a mitigation strategy
against disturbances during post-merger integration. Finley and Bonno (2012) mentioned
poor product quality and slack fill rates that could affect customer delivery. Competitors
were keen to prey on disturbances as they try to gain customers that were concerned
by the changes the merger. In this case, the inventory build-up would be temporary
and inventory levels would return to lower levels after the completion of the merger.
I believe that this is a weaker argument.Waters and Waters (2003) and Tang (2006)
described risk monitoring, pro-active inventory management and planning of mitigation
actions as effective strategies against operational disturbances. While companies seem to
have several options to mitigate disturbances, revenue growth and cost reduction through
restructuring are two of the most prevalent motives for mergers.
Hypothesis 2. The average inventory levels of merging companies are significantly higher
in the second year after the merger compared to the year before the merger.
The third research question investigates reasons for the inventory build-up. Companies
strive to minimize their inventory to reduce capital costs and signal that they operate
efficiently. There are three reasons why companies still hold inventory. Those reasons are
holding inventory as part of the replenishment cycle to facilitate production and sales to
customers, holding inventory as a buffer stock against risks and uncertainty in demand,
and holding excess inventory due to operational inefficiencies.
Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2009) cited revenue synergies as a frequent
motive for mergers. Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) found market, product
and technology access to be among the most frequent motives. And a survey conducted
by Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) showed that the respondents see product/ market extension
and geographic roll up as the two most important merger motives. Revenue synergies are
likely to create a need for higher inventory to make the new product available or to start
selling in a new market or geography. Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007) showed that on
the long-term companies are able to grow their inventory at similar rates as revenues.
The authors employed a metric called inventory responsiveness, which is calculated as
quarterly inventory growth less quarterly revenue growth. Positive (negative) numbers
express that inventory grows faster (slower) than revenues. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011)
employed a similar metric and observed that inventory grew on average 1% faster than
revenues after the merger. I argue that revenue growth is a main reason for the inventory
build-up. Therefore, inventory and revenue growth should be very similar through all
quarters.
Hypothesis 3. Merging companies grow revenue at similar rates as inventory in the
quarters following an acquisition.
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Inventory can be decomposed into raw material, work in progress, and finished goods.
Each type of inventory fulfills a dedicated purpose. I claim that the development of the
different inventory types allows conclusions on the underlying reasons for the inventory
build-up.
Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) cited supplier re-selection, harmonization of
specifications and purchasing policies to be among the most frequent actions in the pur-
chasing department during post-merger integration. Merging companies have incentives
to build-up raw material inventory when they are concerned that these cause temporary
disruptions to their supply or continuous disadvantages such as longer lead times or lower
reliability of supply deliveries. For instance, Sagner (2012) described that conflicting in-
terests with the merging party may render a key supplier unavailable. Binding supplier
contracts could limited the synergy potential. In addition, temporary increases of raw
material inventory may be desirable when supply certainty is impaired by changes in the
production setup. I believe that these negative effects are likely to outweigh potential
inventory synergies from the merger. Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) and Schweiger and Lippert
(2005) noted that the higher purchasing power of the combined entity can improve the
negotiation position when bargaining on delivery terms with suppliers. However, the syn-
ergies evolve mostly from transport cost and purchase prices reductions while raw material
inventory is likely to be used as a buffer against adverse effects.
Hypothesis 4a. The inventory build-up occurs in work in raw material inventory.
The purpose of work in progress inventory is to maintain and facilitate a smooth produc-
tion. A buildup in work in progress inventory would indicate a fundamental change in
the production and logistics setup which necessitates higher inventory. Finley and Bonno
(2012) and Srai et al. (2010) described such changes to include restructuring of produc-
tion and distribution footprint, re-allocation of production, creation of shared services
and consolidation of inbound and outbound logistics. Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory
(2010) added changes in outsourcing, production line redeployment, know-how transfer
and equipment investments for production task changes and for technology upgrades to
the list. I argue that these changes can create a need to hold higher inventory levels.
For instance, a close-down of production facilities targets at increased capacity utilization
which may create bottlenecks in production and logistics that result in higher inventory
positions. Bottlenecks in production may also occur when the merging company is able
to increase its volumes to an extent that limitations of the equipment are reached. An
extension of the product portfolio may require to hold on stock a larger variety of in-
termediate products. Potential problems in the post-merger integration would become
visible in a pile-up of work in progress inventory. Tompkins (2012) stated facilities and
technologies as potential constraints for merger integration. For instance, fundamentally
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different production and IT systems could make supply chains incompatible.
Hypothesis 4b. The inventory build-up occurs in work in progress inventory.
The primary purpose of finished good inventory is to ensure product availability and on-
time customer deliveries throughout the distribution network. Merging companies can
have an interest to increase finished good inventory if they anticipate demand growth.
Persuading new customers often involves offering additional services, such as on-demand
deliveries or promising no stock-outs. The argumentation line is in line with hypothesis
3. If revenue growth is a main driver for inventory growth, than this should reflect in
particular in finished goods inventory.
Hypothesis 4c. The inventory build-up occurs in finished goods inventory.
The fourth research question examines which companies are likely to experience higher
inventory growth. The following hypothesis examines the relationship of inventory build-
up with gross margin, inventory turnover, capital intensity, acquirer and target size.
Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) employed gross margin return on inventory (GMROI) as a
measure of supply chain performance. GMROI reflects how much money a company is
able to earn for each dollar invested into inventory. Companies can imporve their GMROI
performance by increasing their gross margin or by increasing their inventory turnover.
This describes a strategic choice each company faces to generate returns through high
profitability or through high volumes. Companies that target a high gross margin typically
have a premium offering that allows them to charge relatively higher prices. The premium
offering may entail logistic services such as fast delivery, high availability of spare parts
and guarantees for no stock-outs. Providing the logistic services often requires special
arrangements and expertise in logistics and inventory management. Therefore, I argue
that companies with a high gross margin are better prepared to manage their inventory
efficiently and will experience lower inventory build-ups.
Hypothesis 5a. Gross margin is negatively correlated with the build-up of above average
inventory.
Continuing the argumentation from hypothesis 5a, companies that do not chose to gen-
erate returns through a premium offering by default opt to operate in a high volume
business. Naturally, there may be companies that try to occupy the middle ground and
provide a medium priced offering if they see sufficient demand. However, I believe that
these cases can be neglected as the competitive environment forces companies to make a
clear strategic choice. The companies that go into the volume business are likely to have
higher inventory turnovers as they can utilize their capacity more efficiently. Due to the
high volumes, the effect of any adverse changes such as longer lead times or disturbances
will be magnified. Therefore, I argue that companies with high inventory turnover are
associated with higher inventory build-ups.
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Hypothesis 5b. Inventory turnover is positively correlated with the build-up of above
average inventory.
Capital intensity is a proxy for infrastructure investments such as IT systems, production
plants, transportation equipment and warehousing. Higher developed IT systems may
plan better for future demand uncertainty and optimize production plans accordingly.
Better infrastructure in plants and equipment enables to execute the plans accurately and
efficiently. I claim that higher capital intensity is linked to superior inventory management
that reduces the needs for inventory build-up after a merger.
Hypothesis 5c. Capital intensity is negatively correlated with build-up of above average
inventory.
Larger companies can afford more advanced analytics and inventory management tools
that help them cope with operational changes. With superior tools and the ability to
dedicate resources to an acquisition, larger companies may find it easier to integrate an
acquisition and avoid creation of additional inventory. Larger companies are also more
likely to be serial acquirers. Hayward (2002) showed that serial acquirers are able to learn
from their mistakes and on average can achieve better M&A performance. I expect larger
acquirers to generate lower inventory build-ups.
Hypothesis 5d. The size of acquiring company is negatively correlated with the build-up
of above average inventory.
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) and Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) found that smaller targets were
likely to receive less management attention. After the deal was closed, top management
attention diverted and the integration was carried out with less rigor and control. I argue
that smaller target companies are associated with higher inventory build-ups. I believe
that the negative effect of low management attention for small targets outweighs the
positive effect that stems from smaller targets being easier to integrate. Smaller targets
typically have a smaller number of production sites and warehouses and are likely to not
have a multitude of different IT systems. Although they may appear to be easier to inte-
grate, I believe that the contrary is the case. Management underestimates the challenges
in integration smaller targets and diverts its attention to bigger topics. I argue that a
higher inventory build-up can be a negative outcome from lower management attention.
This argumentation is in line with findings by Langabeer (2003). Their analysis showed
that deal values and post-merger supply chain performance are negatively correlated.
Larger target companies appear to be more difficult to integrate.
Hypothesis 5e. The size of target company is negatively correlated with the build-up of
above average inventory.
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4 Data and methodology
The first subsection describes the employed data and offers descriptive statistics for the
sample. The second subsection reviews the methodology used in the analysis section.
And the third subsection gives an overview to the variables and introduces descriptive
statistics.
4.1 Sample data
This section describes the used data sources, processing of the data, and illustrates sample
characteristics in descriptive statistics. The sample is drawn from a population of merg-
ers in the period 1978-2009 that is available from the Securities Data Corporation SDC
M&A database. Companies from the financial industry are excluded because their low
comparability with conventional companies (Standard Industry Classification SIC codes
6000 - 6999). The initial sample covers 5289 deals. I impose additional conditions to
ensure a significant impact on the business operations. The deal needs to be completed
and the acquiring company needs to obtain at least a 33.3% share in the target company,
representing a controlling interest. I exclude any deals involving a company buying its
own shares, e.g. acquisitions of remaining interest.
Accounting data is retrieved from the Standard & Poors Compustat database through
the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). The databases SDC and Compustat use
different primary keys to identify companies. In 489 cases it is not possible to match the
codes of either the acquiring or the target company leading to the exclusion of the obser-
vation. In particular, SDC uses historical CUSIP codes while Compustat uses GVKEY
as a company identifier. While GVKEY uniquely identifies a specific company at any
point in time, the historical CUSIP code of a company changes to reflect changes in the
financing structure. The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tracks historical
CUSIPs. I access CRSP through the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) to match
historical CUSIPs and GVKEYs. In addition, I perform a manual check for the company
name to identify GVKEYs not included in CRSP. In doing so I account for name changes
with publicly available information on the internet. For 3590 deals identified from SDC,
it is possible to match the CUSIP and GVKEY identifiers. Deals are excluded when
missing accounting data in the period from four quarters before to eight quarters after
the merger of either the target and the acquiring company. Several firms are excluded
because the financial data needs to be available on quarterly level for the analysis. For
1345 deals, quarterly financial information is available for both acquiring and target firm.
I still exclude industries in for which inventory do not play a significant role, transport
and utilities, services and public administration. The final sample covers 926 deal. Table
1 illustrates the split by acquirer industry and 15 in the appendix for the split by target
industry.
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Table 1: Data availability and sample size by industry of the acquiring firm
Retrieved
from SDC
database
Acquirer
data
available
Target
data
available
Data
available
for both
Deals
included in
sample
% of total
in sample
Mining and Construction 267 110 155 67 59 6.4
Process manufacturing 563 409 387 284 252 27.2
High tech manufacturing 1083 850 714 561 478 51.6
Transport and Utilities 484 200 300 127 0 0.0
Trade 331 228 222 154 137 14.7
Services 862 242 515 152 0 0.0
Total 3590 2039 2293 1345 926 100.0
The table shows the number of deals by industry of the acquiring firm, based on one-digit SIC
codes. Deals were excluded from the original sample due to missing data for the acquiring or
target firm. In addition, deals with firms in the service, and transport and utilities industries
were excluded because inventory does not play a significant role for them.
The following financial items are collected from the Compustat database: total assets
(data item: ATQ), inventory (INVTQ), net sales (SALEQ), cost of goods sold (COGSQ),
and operating income before depreciation (OIBDPQ). In total I retrieve 14 quarters of
accounting data: five quarters before the merger, eight quarters after the merger, and the
quarter of the merger itself. The four quarters before the merger are a comparison pe-
riod for pre-merger level of performance. For the post-merger period, I analyze two years
after the date when merger became effective. The idea that post-merger activities are
concentrated on the weeks and months immediately after closing the deal is very promi-
nent in academia and in practice. Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) described
three phases in post-merger integration: The first 100 days often entailed the biggest de-
cisions, as the uncertainty in the merging organizations created a window of opportunity
for change. The second phase was called value delivery and occurred within the first year
after the merger. The execution was completed by the third phase in which the organiza-
tion returned to business as usual. Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005) supported this idea.
They propose that supply chain leaders were actively involved in earlier phases before the
change of control to ensure that their function can take a head start in capturing supply
chain synergies.
Table 2 describes the merger intensity in the sample over the years 1978-2009. The
number of mergers has increased over the decades and mergers are concentrated over
time in merger waves. In the late 70s and early 80s, the number of observations per year
ranges between 1-7. Merger intensity peaks in the late 80s with 26 observations in 1986
and in 1989. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) characterized these mergers as driven
by the deregulation in the financial industry and innovation of electronic technologies.
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Table 2: Number and average size of acquisitions by year, in $ million
Year
Number of
observations
Mean
inventory
level
Mean
total assets
Inventory
as % of
total assets
1978 2 384.0 1562.8 22.5
1979 1 4397.0 40988.0 10.7
1980 3 832.0 3531.9 29.4
1981 5 928.8 3972.0 26.1
1982 7 817.7 4579.1 20.5
1983 6 703.4 3620.4 20.0
1984 23 703.9 4589.5 21.5
1985 21 857.8 4344.2 21.8
1986 26 359.8 2142.2 19.1
1987 25 973.6 6639.7 18.6
1988 25 954.2 6535.9 22.1
1989 26 898.6 4353.6 21.7
1990 17 517.6 2477.9 25.1
1991 15 439.7 2540.5 12.6
1992 11 225.3 943.6 18.5
1993 23 306.4 2490.3 17.0
1994 27 577.7 3176.8 20.2
1995 32 563.2 4278.4 16.9
1996 46 631.7 3198.5 18.3
1997 62 635.9 4772.4 17.5
1998 71 672.9 4711.3 15.8
1999 70 825.9 8018.7 13.3
2000 73 783.7 6470.9 15.5
2001 52 731.7 6797.3 15.2
2002 28 1270.6 8391.7 19.3
2003 28 587.4 7318.2 12.8
2004 31 1108.3 6577.9 14.0
2005 35 950.1 15737.1 11.1
2006 36 1449.1 16715.3 11.7
2007 46 724.1 7421.3 11.3
2008 27 1604.3 21370.3 8.6
2009 26 2392.6 38750.1 9.1
Total 926 837.9 7646.7 16.1
The table shows the number of mergers, their mean average inventory and assets per year
in the sample period 1978-2009. Inventory and assets are shown for the pro-forma combined
entity of acquiring and target company.
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These mergers were characterized by an increase of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts
and going private transactions. There was an increasing share of smaller deals as small
and medium sized companies started acting as buyers and big corporations divested from
their inefficient business areas.
The merger market cools down in the early 90s and the number of observations in the
sample decline to 11 in 1992. The next merger wave issues in the following years and
peaks in the years 1998-2000 with over 70 mergers per year. Acquiring companies sought
to acquire strategic combinations that could create synergies and fight off the tougher
competition. There was also an increasing shares of cross-border deals. All sizes of
companies and all industries showed high activity in this merger wave. This is reflected in
the combined assets of acquiring and target company. In earlier years, mean total assets
in most years ranged between between $ 2000-4500 million. After 1997, the average
combined assets are above $ 4700 million for all years.
The merger wave ends with the burst of the dot-com bubble. In 2002 and 2003, the
number of mergers in the sample is down to 28. The most recent merger wave occurred
2004-2007. The sample shows a maximum of 46 observations in 2007. These mergers were
driven by excess liquidity and low financing rates. The average combined assets peak up
to over $ 15000 million in the late 2000s with the maximum of $ 38750.1 million in 2009.
The increasing size of merging companies is also reflected in the joint inventory position.
The average inventory for most years before the 2000s is below the average of $ 837.9
million. In the late 2000s the average inventory increases to over $ 1000 million in most
years. This increasing assets and inventory of the merging entities pose an challenge to
post-merger integration. With size the complexity and interconnections of supply chain
operations increases. This emphasizes the need for stronger supply chain involvement to
make post-merger integration successful as proposed by Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005)
and Finley and Bonno (2012).
A prominent explanation for mergers being clustered into waves is that they are caused by
industry shocks, such as financial deregulation and technical innovation in the 1980s. In
this case, the change in profitability after a merger may be over-ridden by industry or econ-
omy wide trends. Therefore, performance needs to be adjusted by industry performance.
For instance, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) proposed to adjust the merging company’s
operational performance by comparing to its closest rivals. Operational performance and
profitability may well be affected by industry shocks such as financial deregulation or oil
price changes. However, they are unlikely to affect the medium to long-term inventory
development. Therefore, I do not adjust of industry or rival performance when analyzing
the post-acquisition inventory development.
Table 3 shows the average inventory levels for acquiring and target company before the
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Table 3: Average inventory levels by industry before the merger, in $ million
2 digit
SIC code
Number of
observations
Mean
inventory
level
% of
total
assets
Median
inventory
level
% of
total
assets
Panel A: Average inventory position of acquiring company by industry
Mining 10-14 46 404.3 4.4 48.2 2.8
Construction 15-17 13 813.1 54.4 531.1 60.6
Food and kindred products 20 35 1075.2 19.9 813.2 21.9
Paper 26 21 1062.4 11.1 518.6 11.2
Printing and publishing 27 19 101.6 7.8 46.5 6.2
Chemicals 28 129 1236.4 11.9 511.0 10.4
Other process manufacturing 48 694.0 20.7 231.1 20.3
Primary metal industries 33 26 535.5 16.2 246.0 17.3
Industrial machinery 35 100 761.5 14.5 296.9 13.2
Electronics 36 123 460.7 16.2 82.2 15.0
Transportation equipment 37 35 1400.5 17.1 723.9 14.9
Instruments and related products 38 124 439.7 14.5 124.9 13.3
Other high tech manufacturing 70 234.1 20.1 131.7 18.6
Wholesale - durable goods 50 27 640.4 31.1 243.7 34.9
Wholesale - nondurable goods 51 20 1293.9 26.4 476.8 29.7
General merchandise stores 53 20 2968.1 37.6 2755.6 35.0
Food stores 54 17 862.9 28.3 521.4 32.0
Eating and drinking places 58 17 87.8 5.6 7.6 2.7
Other retail trade 36 1028.4 34.6 214.0 37.1
Total 926 926 762.7 17.4 225.7 14.1
Panel B: Average inventory position of target company by industry
Mining 10-14 47 156.5 9.9 7.4 2.9
Construction 15-17 12 30.1 6.4 0.5 0.4
Food and kindred products 20 38 236.3 12.2 6.3 10.5
Paper 26 20 78.5 15.6 36.0 12.8
Printing and publishing 27 16 36.6 11.8 8.0 2.4
Chemicals 28 99 94.4 11.1 9.5 6.5
Other process manufacturing 51 112.1 14.6 17.9 10.8
Primary metal industries 33 19 61.5 12.8 7.1 12.0
Industrial machinery 35 110 81.3 15.1 6.2 13.8
Electronics 36 135 35.4 14.7 5.8 11.4
Transportation equipment 37 21 92.9 11.2 16.6 4.7
Instruments and related products 38 147 61.8 11.5 4.4 5.5
Other high tech manufacturing 67 41.6 15.8 9.5 12.8
Wholesale - durable goods 50 35 67.6 16.3 5.4 10.3
Wholesale - nondurable goods 51 17 34.0 20.3 5.6 12.7
General merchandise stores 53 10 66.2 17.8 33.5 16.7
Food stores 54 14 67.3 17.5 20.8 13.8
Eating and drinking places 58 15 9.2 9.5 4.7 6.2
Other retail trade 53 44.0 16.7 11.7 10.9
Total 926 926 75.2 13.6 8.1 8.8
The table shows mean inventory levels and inventory as % of total assets over the four quarters
before the merger (q-4 - q-1). Industries are defined based on two-digit SIC codes. Industries
with a low number of observations are grouped together in other segments.
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merger. The split by industry is determined by the two-digit primary SIC code. It shows
substantial differences in the number of mergers and the size of inventory position held
by the average company. Acquiring companies hold on average $762.7 million in inven-
tory which is more than ten times as much as acquiring firms $75.2 million. For median
averages, the difference is even bigger with acquiring companies holding $22.7 million and
target companies holding $8.1 million in inventory. Acquiring companies also tend to hold
higher inventory as a % of total assets. Their mean percentage lies at 17.4% compared
to 13.6% for target companies. This indicates that acquiring companies have either less
efficient inventory holding practices or they operate in a more complex, geographically
extended supply chain that necessitates holding additional inventory.
The majority of companies in the sample are in the manufacturing industry (742 out
of 926 deals).482 deals were initiated by firms in high tech manufacturing (SIC codes
starting with 3) and 260 deals were executed by acquiring firms in the process manu-
facturing industry (SIC codes starting with 2). Companies in instruments and related
products are with 147 deals most active in initiating deals, followed by electronics with
135 deals. The two industry segments are characterized by below average inventory levels
for acquiring and target companies. While all manufacturing companies have incentives
to minimize their inventory position to avoid capital holding costs and signal efficient pro-
cesses, companies producing instruments and electronics often have additional incentives.
For instance, computer hardware and electronic components tend to rapidly lose value
due to constant innovation and development of new and better products.
Among the acquiring companies, there are 145 companies in trade industry which are
characterized by high average inventory levels (SIC codes starting with 5). General mer-
chandise stores hold mean inventory of $1746.1 million and business in the wholesale of
nondurable goods hold $1394.6 million, making these industry segments clearly the ones
with highest inventory positions compared to other segments. With the exception of
eating and drinking places, trade companies also hold above average inventory as a %
of revenue positions. Trading companies are expected to hold high inventory positions.
Product availability is a crucial factor for stable revenues and customer loyalty. Hold-
ing additional inventory is a tool to ensure timely delivery and constant availability of
products. Surprisingly, target companies in many trade industry segments appear to hold
below average inventory levels. The mean target companies in wholesale of durable goods
hold $67.6 million in inventory, food stores hold $67.3 million and general merchandise
stores hold $66.2 million, which are all below the mean of the entire sample of $75.2 mil-
lion. A potential explanation is that trading companies are acquired due to their superior
inventory management practices.
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For the definition of the merger date, I follow Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011). The merger
date is determined by the time when the merger becomes effective. This is the moment
when the acquiring company gains control over the target entity. The post-merger inte-
gration can be initiated including operational changes that are likely to affect inventory
levels. In contrast, most M&A studies employ the announcement date. The announce-
ment date is more appropriate which is the correct date when observing stock market
reactions rather than operational changes.
Absolute accounting numbers affected by inflation over time. To make pre- and post-
merger data comparable, I deflate all accounting metrics to 2009 dollars. I use quarterly
inflation data from St. Louis FED FRED.
Extreme outliers can result in distorted estimates. To improve the robustness of results I
winsorize the accounting data (specify what is winsorized) at the 1% level at both tails.
That means that the 1% of the observations at either tail of the observation are trans-
formed into the value at the 1% and 99% percentile respectively. Winsorization results in
more robust estimates.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
The previous section summarized the data collection and sample characteristics. The
following section presents descriptive statistics, as well as definitions and descriptions of
key variables.
Table 4 shows key financial data in the four quarters before the merger in four panels:
Data describing acquiring firms, target firms, the pro-forma combined firm, and further
company descriptives derived from the data. Panel A shows that the mean average ac-
quiring firm holds $6676.5 million in assets and generates $1778.4 million in revenue per
quarter. That makes the average acquiring firm about seven times the size of the average
target firm as the comparison to panel B makes visible. The average target firm holds
$970.2 million in assets and generates $239.0 million in revenue per quarter. In terms of
inventory, the difference is even more distinct as the average acquiring firms holds about
ten times the inventory of the average target firm.
Due to the relatively small size of target companies, the pro-forma combined entity is
dominated by the acquiring firm. Potential changes in the post-merger integration to the
acquirer’s operations are likely to be reflected to a stronger extent. Larger companies
are likely to have several business units with varying degree of integration amongst each
other. Changes in another business units during the post-merger integration can affect
the development of inventory development. Special attention is attributed to the quar-
terly development of inventory growth in table 7. It shows that inventory growth peaks
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Table 4: Key metrics for sample description, $ million
Defintion Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Panel A: Average for acquiring firms
Inventory 762.7 225.7 1366.1
Assets 6676.5 1558.2 15399.0
Revenue 1778.4 436.8 4036.4
Costs of goods sold 1107.9 252.9 2991.8
Panel B: Average for target firms
Inventory 75.2 8.1 298.6
Assets 970.2 118.2 3747.3
Revenue 239.0 33.0 898.6
Costs of goods sold 169.3 18.5 687.8
Panel C: Average for pro-forma combined firm
Inventory 837.9 287.0 1419.9
Assets 7646.7 2168.2 16716.3
Revenue 2017.3 584.2 4208.8
Costs of goods sold 1277.2 345.3 3099.1
Panel D: Derived metrics for company descriptives
Inventory turnover Costs of goods sold/ Inventory 2.3 1.3 5.9
Gross margin (Revenue-COGS)/ Revenue 0.4 0.3 0.2
Capital intensity Revenue/ Total assets 4.3 3.6 2.9
The table shows mean and median of key financials before the merger (q-4 - q-1). Panel
A shows averages for the acquiring firm, Panel B for the target firms and Panel C for
both firm combined. Panel D shows metrics that are derived from the pro-forma com-
bined financials in Panel C. These metrics serve as explanatory variables in the regression
analysis.
in the first and second quarter after the merger, giving support to the hypothesis that the
observed inventory effect is really related to changes in the post-merger integration.
Panel C of table 4 shows statistics for the pro-forma combined entity of acquiring and
target firm which is created by adding up data for acquiring and target company. The
mean average revenue per quarter lies at $2017.3 million. The median average is consid-
erably lower and lies at $584.2 million. Together with the standard deviation of 4208.8,
this indicates that the size of companies in the sample varies remarkably. The sample is
skewed positively which means that a over-proportional share of companies are smaller
than the mean average with a small number of especially large companies. The pattern is
typical as most companies are small and medium enterprises and only few grow to become
multi-national corporations.
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Panel D displays three metrics that are derived from the financial metrics of the pro-
forma combined entities. The metrics include inventory turnover, gross margin and capital
intensity. Together with measures for the size of acquiring and target firm, the metrics
are used as explanatory variables for the regression analysis. For acquirer and target size,
I use the natural logarithm ln of mean assets to linearize their relationship. See section
4.3 Methodology for the formulation of the regression models.
The average pro-forma combined company has an inventory turnover of 2.3 per quarter,
which means that it needs to replenish its average inventory position 2.3 times per month
to keep its operations running. Inventory turnover is calculated as the ratio of costs of
goods sold over inventory. Higher values indicate superior performance as the company is
able to use its inventory more efficiently. An alternative definition for inventory turnover
calculated the ratio of revenue over inventory. As all inventory with the exception of some
finished goods are valued in the balance sheet at costs, the definition using costs of goods
sold is more accurate. A benefit of using revenue in the calculation of inventory turnover
is that the interpretation is slightly more intuitive. Inventory turnover then measures
investment into inventory required to generate the company’s revenue. More efficient
companies need to invest less to achieve the same results.
Inventory turnover is the inverse of inventory period, another standard supply chain mea-
sure. Inventory period measures the average time inventory lie on stock before they are
being used in production or sold. The gross margin of the average company in the sam-
ple is 0.4. For each dollar in revenue that the company generates, approximately 60%
are spend on costs of goods sold and 40% are left over to pay fixed costs and for profit.
Gross margin percentage is a common measure for a company’s profitability. Companies
with higher profitability typically target a premium segment of the market. The value
proposition to premium customers often involves additional services including fast deliv-
ery, instant availability of spare parts or the promise to avoid stock-outs. Offering the
services may involve the creation of additional inventory and securing the continuance of
the services during the post-merger integration is essential for a successful merger.
Capital intensity is measured as assets over revenue. The average company has a cap-
ital intensity of 4.3. It to reflect the amount of investments required from a company
to generate its revenues. In this study, capital intensity is used as a proxy for tools
and infrastructures that are available to a company. For instance, investments into IT
tools, warehouses and transportation systems will enter the balance sheets as fixed assets.
The investments are likely to improve the company’s ability to manage its inventory and
predict demand. Through that, the investments are likely to also affect the inventory
development during post-merger integration.
Table 5 shows the decomposition of inventory types into raw material, work in progress
and finished goods. While the entire sample consists of 926 deals, only a fraction reports
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Table 5: Decomposition by inventory type, $ million
Number of
observations
Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Total inventory entire sample 926 919.1 309.3 1532.6
Total inventory with inventory decomposition 58 1126.4 562.6 1393.0
Raw material inventory 63 295.9 140.3 367.3
Work in progress inventory 58 265.0 117.7 401.3
Finished good inventory 74 617.2 295.1 821.1
The table shows average inventory levels decomposed to inventory types: raw material, work
in progress and finished goods. Only a small sub-set of companies reports decomposition of
inventory.
the decomposition of inventory. For 65 deals, data on quarterly raw material levels is
available for both acquiring and target company. For 63 deals, work in progress has been
reported and for 77 deals the finished good inventory.
Companies that report inventory decomposition have higher averages inventory with a
mean average of $1126 million compared to $919 million for the entire sample. However,
the standard deviation of inventory is lower, with the mean average at 1393.0 compared
to 1532.6. Although the companies that report inventory decomposition have higher
inventory levels, they are able to run their operations in a smooth and balanced manner.
As elaborated in section 3 Hypotheses, each type of inventory serves a distinct purpose
and the development of each inventory type can give cues on what happens during post-
merger integration with inventory. The purpose of finished good inventory is to secure
availability of products and timely delivery of customer orders. Finished good inventory is
typically found in distribution warehouses and on the way to the end customer. Finished
goods account for the biggest share in total inventory (54.8%) and changes will have a
bigger impact on total inventory development than for the other types of inventory.
Raw material and work in progress make up for the remaining inventory in almost equal
shares, with mean averages of $295.9 million and $265.0 million respectively. The purpose
of raw material inventory is to buffer against potential disruptions in sourcing that can be
caused by late or bad deliveries by suppliers. Work in progress inventory is held to ensure
a smooth production and balancing of bottlenecks. Out of all reasons to hold inventory,
demand uncertainty is the most difficult to plan in advance and can have the most severe
impact of sales. This explains why companies on average hold most of their inventory
in finished goods. It also can explain that the standard deviation in inventory increases
from 367.3 for raw material, to 401.3 for work in progress, and up to 821.1 for finished
good inventory.
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4.3 Methodology
The previous sections reviewed the sample data and descriptive statistics. The following
section concerns methodologies used to analyzed the four research questions outlined in
the introduction.
The first research questions intends to confirm the existence of the phenomenon of in-
ventory build-up during the post-merger integration period. I compare average inventory
levels and quarterly inventory growth rates of the merging companies before and after the
merger. First, I calculate mean and median average inventory levels in the four quarters
before the merger q-4 to q-1 and in the four quarters after the merger Q1 to Q4. The
difference of the two numbers is the increase of inventory above pre-deal average. My
methodology is comparable to Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and Ghosh (2001).
To test for statistical significance in differences from zero, I employ student’s t-test for
means. For medians, I employ the Wilcoxon sign rank test. This test is a non-parametric
and distribution free test. It does not require standard distribution of the population.
The test procedure takes the absolute difference of pre- and post-value, orders the values
from smallest to largest and ranks them by assigning 1 to the smallest value. The test
statistic is calculated as the absolute value of the sum of the signed ranks.
Second, I verify whether the inventory build-up persists or reverts in the second year after
the merger. I compare average pre-merger inventory levels in q-4 to q-1 to the averages
in the second year after the merger Q5 to Q8. I repeat the testing procedure by taking
differences and testing for differences from zero with student’s t-test for means and with
Wilcoxon sign rank for medians. If the effect is reverted in the second year, the inventory
build-up would be driven by temporary motives connected to the post-merger integration.
A sustainable increase in inventory indicates a fundamental change in the business. The
phenomenon of inventory build-up after a merger is established if inventory levels are
significantly higher after the merger and if the higher inventory levels are not reverted in
the following year.
Studies that analyzed changes in stock market valuation often used a time horizon of
several years to analyze long-term effects of an acquisition. For instance, Ghosh (2001)
looked at three years following the merger date and Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) even
at five years. In contrast, studies that looked at operational metrics often used shorter
time horizons. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) used one year before and two years after to
compare inventory-related metrics before and after the merger. Langabeer (2003) used
only one year before and after the merger. Hendricks and Singhal (2005) analyzed the
effect of supply chain glitches on operating performance in the two years following supply
chain glitches that are publicly announced. The more time passes after a merger, the more
likely are operational metrics affected by factors other than the acquisition. The factors
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include operational improvement, new customer needs and new technologies. The prac-
tice of evaluating two years after an acquisition is supported by the typical post-merger
integration process. Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) described the three stages
of post-merger integration. The 100 days right after the merger often entail the biggest
decisions, as the uncertainty in the merging organizations creates a window of opportunity
for change. In the first year after the merger, activities focus on value delivery. There-
after, operations return to business as usual. Therefore, I focus on the first and second
year after the merger to evaluate whether the inventory build-up persists or is reverted.
The second research question concerns the timing of the change in inventory levels. Previ-
ous studies such as Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) compared average inventory levels before
and after mergers. However, a detailed understanding for when the increase in inventory
occurs is missing. I calculate quarter over quarter inventory growth rates from quarter
q-4 to Q8. An individual company may experience quarterly variations as part of their
operations in any quarter. However, on average growth rates are close to the long-term
average. The quarters following a merger are exceptional as the growth rate peaks to
above normal levels. To account for the long-term average growth trend, I deduct the
average growth rate from each quarter’s average. The average growth rate is calculated
as the mean over all firm quarter observations. The resulting variable is called inventory
growth rate above average. It reflects the extraordinary share of the growth rate which
exceeds usual levels. For each quarterly average, I test the difference to zero with the
student’s t-test for means and the Wilcoxon sign rank for medians.
The third research questions investigates potential reasons for the inventory build-up, in-
cluding expected and realized revenue growth and fundamental changes in the production
and supply chain setup. First, I compare inventory and revenue growth rates to under-
stand in how far inventory growth is driven by the companies growth ambition. I utilize
a measure called inventory responsiveness, which is calculated as the quarterly inven-
tory growth less revenue growth. Inventory responsiveness measures whether inventory
and sales grow at the same rate. Positive (negative) values indicate that inventory grow
faster (more slowly) than sales. Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007) showed that compa-
nies should aim to align the growth of inventory to the growth in sales. An alternative
interpretation connects to lean manufacturing in which companies drastically reduce their
inventory levels. In these situations the fundamental relationship that connects growth
in sales and inventory is dissolved and companies would aim for negative values of inven-
tory responsiveness. The quarterly values for inventory responsiveness are driven by a
long-term growth trend, similarly as the quarterly inventory growth rate. I calculate the
long-term average inventory responsiveness across all firm quarter observations. I deduct
the long-term average from each quarter’s average. The resulting measure is called in-
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ventory responsiveness above average and reflects the extraordinary share of inventory
responsiveness. I test each quarters mean inventory responsiveness above average for its
difference from zero using the student’s t-test. Median averages are not reported in this
study. The findings are in line with the ones from analyzing mean averages.
Second, I decompose the inventory position into raw material, work in progress and fin-
ished good inventory. According to hypothesis 5, each type of inventory is dedicated to
a distinct purpose. The development of each type of inventory is expected to give clues
to the causes behind the inventory build-up. As illustrated in table 5, the sample size
for this part of the analysis is substantially smaller. Only for 60 out of 926 deals in the
full sample, acquiring and target company both report the decomposition of inventory.
For each type of inventory, I calculate quarterly median averages across firm observations
from quarter q-4 to Q8. As for the inventory growth rate, I deduct the average growth
rate from each quarter’s average to account for the long-term growth trend. The average
growth rate is calculated as the mean over all firm quarter observations. The resulting
variable is called inventory growth rate above average. It reflects the extraordinary share
of the growth rate which exceeds usual levels. For each quarterly average, I test the dif-
ference to zero with the student’s t-test.
The fourth research question looks at company characteristics and their relationship to
the inventory build-up phenomenon. First, a measure for the inventory build-up is needed.
I calculate the compound average growth rate (CAGR) of inventory between Q1 and Q4
for each firm in the sample. As I am interested in the exceptional part of the inventory
growth, I again deduct the average growth rate for all firm quarter observations. The
inventory build-up is partially caused by revenue growth. Therefore, I create a second
measure that aims to eliminate the inventory growth caused by revenue growth. I calculate
the compound average growth rate (CAGR) for inventory responsiveness between Q1 and
Q4. The inventory growth rate is replaced by the difference of inventory growth rate and
revenue growth rate.
Second, I develop a regression model to assess the relationship of explanatory variables
to the measure of inventory build-up. As mentioned in section 4.2 Descriptive statistics,
the explanatory variables comprise gross margin, inventory turnover, capital intensity,
size of the target company and of the acquiring company. I follow standard econometric
practices as shown in Verbeek (2008) and Dougherty (2011). In an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression model, the coefficient estimates of explanatory variables are calculated
by minimizing the sum of the squared residuals. The coefficient estimate shows how
the explanatory variable affects the dependent variable (e.g. inventory turnover) when
controlling for other explanatory variables.
Important considerations in developing regression models are heterogeneity, heteroscedas-
ticity and multicollinearity. Heterogeneity bias is caused by unobserved effects that are
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correlated with the explanatory variables. Unobserved effects can relate to the industry
or time. As the model is not able to control for the unobserved effect, the coefficient
estimate of the explanatory variable will be biased. Even if the unobserved effects are
not correlated with the explanatory variables, the OLS model generates biased standard
errors and inefficient estimates. In a fixed effects model, dummy variables for industry
and year are added to gauge the unobserved effects. When adding a dummy variable one
category of the variable needs to be excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap. Without
the reference category the sum of categories would equal to 1 for all observations resulting
in perfect multicollinearity. One drawback of fixed effects models is that it does not cal-
culate the coefficient estimates of explanatory variables that are constant for a category.
Also, adding dummy variables results in the loss of degrees of freedoms.
Heteroscedasticity arises when error terms do not have a constant variance and leads to
biased standard errors and thus biased test statistics. Therefore I use White (1980) stan-
dard errors, which are heteroscedasticity-consistent.
For high correlations between explanatory variables and for linearly related explanatory
variables, multicollinearity issues arise resulting in flawed coefficient estimates. Mul-
ticollinearity arises when two variables measure the same phenomenon. The Pearson
correlation matrix in table 10 shows that there is little correlation between explanatory
variables which indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue. As expected, relative tar-
get size shows high correlation with acquirer size and with target size. Therefore these
variables should not be used in the same regression model. Despite the low correlation
values, potential multicollinearity issues could arise: Several variables are derived from the
same accounting metrics including revenue, inventory and costs of goods sold. Therefore,
variables that are based on same accounting metrics are not used in the same regression
model.
Gross margin and inventory turnover both depend on the factor costs of goods sold (ab-
breviated as COGS) and should therefore not appear in the same regression model. The
same holds for capital intensity and gross margin in respect to revenue. And capital in-
tensity and company size both depend on assets. For acquirer and target size, I use the
natural logarithm ln of mean assets to linearize their relationship.
Under consideration of the constraints for using variables in the same regression model,
I formulate the following six regression models. Note that the equations represent least
square dummy variable (LSDV) regressions. The dummy variables for industry and year
effects are not listed here to improve readability.
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Inventory CAGR Q1 - Q4 = β1 ×Gross margin
+ β2 × Target size + β3 × ∗Acquirer size (1)
CAGR of inv. responsiveness Q1 - Q4 = β1 ×Gross margin
+ β2 × Target size + β3 × ∗Acquirer size (2)
Inventory CAGR Q1 - Q4 = β1 × Inventory turnover
+ β2 × Target size + β3 × ∗Acquirer size (3)
CAGR of inv. responsiveness Q1 - Q4 = β1 × Inventory turnover
+ β2 × Target size + β3 × ∗Acquirer size (4)
Inventory CAGR Q1 - Q4 = β1 × Inventory turnover
+ β2 × Capital intensity (5)
CAGR of inv. responsiveness Q1 - Q4 = β1 × Inventory turnover
+ β2 × Capital intensity (6)
Note that the model does not include a constant. It regresses the deviation from normal
growth levels on company and deal characteristics. That means measures the differen-
tial impact of deal characteristics on the above average inventory growth. The model
follows Ghosh (2001) who argued that change models without a constant are superior to
intercept models as proposed by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992). Intercept models are
named according to their feature that captures the change in performance in the intercept.
The benefit is that persistence of performance is accounted for as temporary deviations
of performance are captured in the random error. However, Ghosh (2001) showed that
intercept models are likely to generate biased estimates. The bias originated from econo-
metric problems and depended on measurement errors, the degree to which merging firms
outperform industry-median firms, and whether the reasons were temporary or perma-
nent. Powell and Stark (2005) compared both methodologies and found the intercept
model generally resulted in higher estimates supporting the notion of Ghosh (2001).
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5 Results
The following section presents the results from the analysis and develops the key findings.
The structure follows the four research questions.
The first research question seeks to confirm that the phenomenon of inventory build-ups
after a merger exists. Average inventory levels of the pro-forma combined entity before
and after the merger are compared and tested to be different at statistical significance.
The comparison shows that inventory levels increase significantly after the merger. Table 6
demonstrates that mean inventory levels increase from $837.9 million in the four quarters
before the merger in the quarter denoted as Q0 to $937.3 million in the four quarters
following the merger. The increase of $99.4 million corresponds to a 21.6% increase of
mean pre-acquisition inventory. Median inventory levels show a similar pattern although
the increase is smaller. Inventory grows from $287.0 million to $306.9 million (12.9% of
median inventory levels before the deal).
The increase in inventory levels persists in the second year (Q5 - Q8 after the merger
date) as inventory continue to grow. Mean inventory levels climb to $993.3 million and
are $155.5 million or 35.3% higher than before the merger. Median inventory are at $325.1
million ($34.9 million or 21.2% above pre-merger levels).
The results are in line with previous literature. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) found that
mean inventory grows by 12% in the first year following the merger and 20% in the sec-
ond year. Table 6 showed that mean inventory grows by 21.6% in the first year and
35.3% in the second year. While the authors observed the same effect, its magnitude
was smaller. A potential reasons is that the their research is limited to a shorter time
period 1997-2006 which includes the dot-com merger wave and may be characterized by
special effects. Table 6 demonstrates that the additional inventory levels are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level. The significance levels hold in case of mean as well
as median averages. Hypothesis 1 is accepted because the results establish that the phe-
nomenon of inventory build-up in the quarters following a merger exists. Hypothesis 2
is also accepted because the inventory build-up is not reverted in the following quarters
as mean and median inventory levels continue to grow in the second year after the merger.
The second research question analyses the timing of the inventory build-up. Inventory
development often follows seasonal cycles and should be analyzed on quarterly basis. I
calculate quarter-over-quarter inventory growth rates to show when the inventory build-up
occurs and whether it is reverted in the following quarters. Table 7 shows that quarterly
inventory growth rates range between 3.65% and 4.76% before the merger. The growth
rate then soars up to 7.89% in Q1 and 6.93% in Q2. In the following quarters it normalizes
at a slightly lower level than before, ranging between 1.49% and 3.97% in Q3 to Q8.
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Table 6: Average inventory levels before and after merger, $ million
Means of all firms Medians of all firms
Average
inventory
level
Inventory
above
pre-deal
average
% of
pre-deal
mean
Average
inventory
level
Inventory
above
pre-deal
average
% of
pre-deal
median
Average q-4 - q-1 837.9 0.0 0.0 287.0 0.0 0.0
Average Q1 - Q4 937.3 99.4*** 21.6 306.9 22.9*** 12.9
(7.1) (12.1)
Average Q5 - Q8 993.3 155.5*** 35.3 325.1 34.9*** 21.2
(7.9) (12.9)
The table shows mean and median inventory levels before and after the merger date. The
average q-4 - q-1 is calculated as the average of means of the pro-forma combined acquir-
ing and target firm. Similarly, averages Q1- Q4 and Q5 - Q8 denote the averages of the
firm’s mean inventory. To test for difference from zero, Student’s t-test for means and
Wilcoxon sign-rank test are employed. The values in brackets denote test statistics. The
stars ***, **, * indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Inventory growth follows a long-term trend. To test whether the inventory growth rate in
a quarter is significantly different, quarterly growth rates are adjusted for the long-term
average growth rate. The average growth rate across all firm quarter observations of
4.11% is deducted from all observations. The difference represents the extraordinary part
of the inventory growth. The extraordinary, above average inventory growth lies at 3.77%
and 2.81% in the first and second quarter after the merger. Employing Student’s t-test
shows that both mean averages are statistically different from zero at the 5% significance
level.
The results are confirmed when using median averages rather than means although the
magnitude is smaller. Inventory growth peaks at 3.55% in Q1. The above average in-
ventory growth rate lies at 1.09%. Testing for differences in medians with Wilcoxon
sign-rank test shows that the above average growth rate is significantly different from
zero at the 5% level. The inventory build-up effect can not be observed in the second
quarter. Median inventory growth rates are lower than the corresponding mean averages
for all quarters. Large outliers for individual firms can explain the difference between
means and medians. Companies can experience extreme inventory growth within a short
time frame. For instance, inventory requirements increase drastically when new prod-
ucts are introduced, production facilities and distribution centers are opened. Table 7
illustrates that the inventory growth peaks in the two quarters following the change of
control. Srai, Bertoncelj, Fleet and Gregory (2010) and Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005)
described that post-merger integration activities are most intensive in the 100 days fol-
lowing the change of control. The uncertainty in the merging organizations creates an
opportunity to initiate change. This analysis suggests that the change results in a need
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Table 7: Inventory growth rate, quarter over quarter
Means of all firms Medians of all firms
Quarter
relative
to merger
Inventory
growth rate
Inventory
growth rate
above average
Inventory
growth rate
Inventory
growth rate
above average
q-4 4.76 0.64 2.28 -0.37
(1.26) (-0.07)
q-3 4.47 0.36 2.15 -0.55
(0.56) (-1.40)
q-2 4.20 0.09 1.80 -0.91*
(0.14) (-1.91)
q-1 3.65 -0.47 1.96 -0.81***
(-0.68) (-3.18)
Q0 4.11 -0.01 2.19 -0.71*
(-0.01) (-1.88)
Q1 7.89 3.77** 3.55 1.09**
(2.92) (2.09)
Q2 6.93 2.81** 2.15 -0.74
(2.44) (-0.84)
Q3 3.97 -0.15 1.46 -1.36***
(-0.15) (-4.21)
Q4 3.58 -0.54 2.00 -1.46***
(-0.80) (-3.82)
Q5 2.24 -1.88*** 1.09 -1.53***
(-3.38) (-5.55)
Q6 3.39 -0.73 1.27 -1.62***
(-0.98) (-5.14)
Q7 1.49 -2.63*** 0.93 -2.01***
(-5.11) (-7.07)
Q8 2.86 -1.26** 1.34 -1.31***
(-2.12) (-4.70)
The table shows mean and median inventory growth rates by quarter relative to the
merger date which is denoted as Q0. To account for long-term growth trend, the av-
erage inventory growth rate is deducted from quarterly growth rates. The average in-
ventory growth rate is calculated across all firm quarter observations. Positive (nega-
tive) values for inventory growth rate above average denote buildup (reduction) of ex-
cess inventory. To test for difference from zero, Student’s t-test for means and Wilcoxon
sign-rank test are employed. The values in brackets denote test statistics. The stars
***, **, * indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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for higher inventory levels. Although other factors including new technologies or higher
customer expectations may cause a similar need, they would be expected to appear at a
specific time rather than after a merger. The change in inventory development occurring
abruptly and right after the change of control is a strong indication that it is linked to
the post-merger integration.
These findings bring novel insights into the timing of the inventory build-up. Existing
research has not investigated when the inventory build-up occurs. Langabeer (2003) used
data from annual reports to get a larger sample size. Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011) used
quarterly data but look at the averages of four quarters before and after the deal. The
recognition that inventory build-up is very closely related to the post-merger integration
raises the questions what happens to inventory in that time period. The third research
question investigates reasons for the inventory build-up.
The third research question investigates potential reasons for the change in inventory de-
velopment after acquisitions. The analysis for hypothesis 2 based on table 6 shows that
the inventory build-up is not reverted in the second year after the merger. Therefore,
temporary reasons to create additional inventory are unlikely. Merging companies seem
to have better tools to prepare for and to respond to operational disruptions that may
occur during the post-merger integration. Waters and Waters (2003) and Tang (2006)
described risk monitoring, pro-active inventory management and planning of mitigation
actions as useful tools. Hypothesis 3 analyses revenue growth as a potential driver for
inventory growth. For hypothesis 4, inventory is decomposed to raw material, work in
progress and finished goods to explore operational changes of suppliers, production setup
and product portfolio.
Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2009) cited revenue synergies as a frequent mo-
tive for mergers. And a survey conducted by Ha¨kkinen et al. (2004) showed that the
respondents see product/ market extension and geographic roll up as the two most im-
portant merger motives. Revenue synergies are likely to create a need for higher inventory
to make the new product available or to start selling in a new market or geography. Table
8 shows inventory responsiveness quarter of quarter. Inventory responsiveness is a metric
used by Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007) to measure how well a company is able to
adapt inventory levels to changes in revenue development. It is calculated as quarterly in-
ventory growth less quarterly revenue growth. Positive values show that inventory grows
faster than revenue, meaning that the firm is building up an inventory position above its
historical levels.
Before the merger, mean inventory responsiveness ranges between -0.90% and +0.92%.
Average revenue growth and inventory growth are very close which suggests that revenue is
an important driver for inventory development. As the companies in the sample grow, they
increase their inventory proportionally to the growth rate. This changes after the merger.
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Table 8: Inventory responsiveness, quarter over quarter
Means of all firms
Quarter
relative
to merger
Inventory
growth rate
Revenue
growth rate
Inventory
responsiveness
Inventory
resonsiveness
above average
q-4 4.82 5.71 -0.90 -1.89*
(-2.4)
q-3 4.47 5.23 -0.75 -1.74*
(-1.66)
q-2 4.20 4.60 -0.40 -1.38
(-1.60)
q-1 3.65 2.73 0.92 -0.07
(-0.08)
Q0 4.11 0.13 3.98 3.00***
(2.68)
Q1 7.89 -0.82 8.72 7.73***
(6.00)
Q2 6.93 5.15 1.78 0.79
(0.61)
Q3 3.97 3.45 0.52 -0.47
(-0.42)
Q4 3.58 2.85 0.73 -0.26
(-0.28)
Q5 2.24 4.05 -1.81 -2.79***
(-2.85)
Q6 3.39 3.10 0.29 -0.69
(-0.74)
Q7 1.49 2.02 -0.54 -1.52*
(-1.76)
Q8 2.86 2.56 0.30 -0.68
(-0.82)
Inventory responsiveness is calculated as inventory growth rate less revenue growth
rate. The average inventory growth rate is calculated across all firm quarter ob-
servations. Positive values for inventory responsiveness mean that inventory grow
faster than revenue. To account for long-term growth trend, the average inven-
tory responsiveness is deducted from quarterly values. The average inventory growth
rate is calculated across all firm quarter observations. Positive (negative) val-
ues for inventory responsiveness above average denote buildup (reduction) of ex-
cess inventory. To test for difference from zero, Student’s t-test for means are
employed. The values in brackets denote test statistics. The stars ***, **,
* indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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In the first quarter, inventory growth soars up to 7.89% while revenue drops by -0.82%.
Inventory responsiveness increases to 8.72%. In the first quarter, inventory growth is not
driven by revenue growth. However, in the second quarter revenue growth can account for
higher inventory growth rates. Inventory grows at 6.93% while revenue increases by 5.15%.
The resulting mean inventory responsiveness lies at 1.78%, which is merely out of the usual
range. In the following quarters Q3 to Q8, inventory responsiveness stabilizes in a range
between -0.54% and 0.73%. The fifth quarter after the merger is an exception as inventory
grows at 2.24% which is clearly below revenue growth 4.05%. Inventory responsiveness
lies at -1.81% which suggests that in this specific quarter the merged companies are able
to grow revenue faster than inventory. In the other quarters, inventory and revenue
development are well aligned. The inventory build-up is not reverted and the merged
companies stabilize on a higher inventory level.
This finding is in line with previous results from Zhu, Boyaci and Ray (2011). Their
analysis shows that average inventory responsiveness in the first year after the merger
is on average 1% above the pre-merger level. For the second year, it is 2% above the
pre-merger level. This analysis shows that hypothesis 3 can only partially be supported.
Revenue growth can explain increased inventory for the second quarter. However, it can
not explain why inventory grows at 7.89% as revenue growth lags behind at -0.82%. This
effect is not reverted in the following quarters. Therefore, it is unlikely that the inventory
increase is caused by overly optimistic management that builds up inventory in antici-
pation of revenue growth. However, gaining new sales in the quarters after the merger
may involve actions that require an over-proportional increase in inventory. For instance,
reaching new, remotely located customers may entail the opening of new warehouses or
longer delivery times. And ensuring steady customer deliveries in the new environment
may require higher safety buffers.
Revenue growth can only partially explain why companies build-up inventory. Decom-
posing inventory into raw material, work in progress and finished goods may lead relevant
insights into the type of inventory that drives the inventory build-up. Raw material in-
ventory is primarily held to secure availability of input for production. As denoted in
hypothesis 4a, merging companies may have an incentive to build up raw material inven-
tory when they are concerned that raw material supply may be disrupted after the merger.
The primary purpose of work in progress is to maintain and facilitate a smooth and ef-
ficient production. Hypothesis 4b states that work in progress inventory could increase
after a merger when production reliability decreases due to a new operating system or a
restructured production network. Bottlenecks in production can occur when companies
are able to grow their business to the capacity limits or when the merger is driven by
the motive to decrease production capacity. The purpose of finished good inventory is
to ensure customer deliveries throughout the distribution network. Hypothesis 4c sug-
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gests that merging companies increase finished good inventory if they anticipate demand
growth. Persuading new customers often involves offering additional services, such as
on-demand deliveries or promising no stock-outs.
Table 9 shows median quarterly growth rates for raw material, work in progress and
finished goods inventory. The table is structured similarly as table 7 which shows quarterly
inventory growth rate for the full sample of 926 companies. Comparing the inventory
development in both tables shows that there are some notable differences between the
sub-sample in table 9 and the full sample in table 7. The long-term average inventory
growth rate is 1.9% in the sub-sample which is clearly below the full sample of 4.1%.
In the first quarter, average inventory in the sub-sample grows by 8.1% at similar rates
as in the full sample 7.9%. However, in the second quarter, inventory growth drops to
-2.6% while the full sample still maintains a high growth rate of 6.9%. In the following
quarters, inventory growth in the sub-sample ranges between -0.4% and 1.5%. This shows
a fundamental difference as the inventory build-up after them merger is reverted in the
following quarters. The inventory development in the sub-sample is not fully comparable
with the full sample. This may be because inventory management is more important for
companies that report detailed inventory decomposition. The reason to report in details
is likely that these metrics are relevant to the specific type of company. And shareholders
are likely to pay more attention to inventory development when it is reported in detail.
Therefore, the companies in the sub-sample may have superior capabilities and a stronger
interest to revert the inventory build-up effect after the merger.
The number of companies that reports the decomposition of inventory to raw material
(63 companies), work in progress (58) and finished goods inventory (74) is substantially
smaller than in the full sample (926). Table 5 in section 4.2 Descriptive statistics shows
that companies that do report detailed numbers tend to be larger, with a mean total in-
ventory of $1126.4 million compared to $919.1 million for companies in the entire sample.
Due to the small sample size, the analysis of decomposed inventory in table 9 should be
treated with care.
The growth rates for raw material inventory range between 1.8% and 15.2% before the
merger. The large variation in averages is likely due to the number of observations as only
63 companies report raw material inventory for the required time period. It is not unusual
for individual companies to exhibit large variations in individual quarters, for instance
when new production sites or warehouses are opened and new products are launched.
There is a peak in inventory growth at 13.8% in the first quarter after the merger. How-
ever, the effect is not significant. In the following quarters, the growth rate ranges between
-3.0% and 7.1%. The analysis gives some support to hypothesis 4a. There is a peak in
inventory growth after the merger. However, it is not statistically significant. The magni-
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Table 9: Decomposition of inventory growth rate to components, quarter over quarter
Total inventory Raw material inv. Work in progress inv. Finished goods inv.
Quarter
relative
to merger
Mean
growth
rate
Growth
rate above
average
Mean
growth
rate
Growth
rate above
average
Mean
growth
rate
Growth
rate above
average
Mean
growth
rate
Growth
rate above
average
Number
of deals
58 58 63 63 58 58 74 74
q-4 3.3 1.4 8.5 3.7 4.0 1.6 6.1 3.1*
(1.3) (0.7) (0.6) (1.8)
q-3 2.1 0.2 1.8 -2.9 0.4 -2.1 2.1 -0.9
(0.6) (-1.0) (-0.9) (-0.5)
q-2 3.6 1.7 15.2 10.5 2.8 0.3 12.3 9.4
(0.1) (1.1) (0.1) (1.6)
q-1 2.8 0.9 5.7 1.0 1.4 -1.0 4.2 1.3
(-0.7) (0.3) (-0.5) (0.6)
Q0 3.9 2.0 3.8 -0.9 4.4 2.0 3.8 0.9
(-0.0) (-0.3) (0.7) (0.4)
Q1 8.1 6.2*** 13.8 9.1 9.9 7.5* 8.2 5.2
(2.9) (1.1) (1.6) (1.2)
Q2 -2.6 -4.5** 2.7 -2.0 0.2 -2.2 -3.0 -5.9**
(2.4) (-0.5) (-0.6) (-2.3)
Q3 3.4 1.5 -0.2 -4.9* 6.8 4.3 1.8 -1.2
(-0.2) (-1.8) (1.4) (-0.5)
Q4 -0.2 -2.1 3.1 -1.7 -0.3 -2.8 0.7 -2.2
(-0.8) (-0.6) (-1.2) (-0.8)
Q5 1.5 -0.4*** -3.0 -7.8*** 3.5 1.1 3.5 0.6
(-3.4) (-2.7) (0.4) (0.2)
Q6 -0.2 -2.1 0.8 -3.9 0.6 -1.8 1.4 -1.6
(-1.0) (-1.5) (-0.6) (-0.9)
Q7 -0.4 -2.3*** 7.1 2.3 -1.9 -4.3** -1.3 -4.3*
(-5.1) (0.5) (-2.0) (-1.9)
Q8 -0.3 -2.2* 2.4 -2.3 -0.1 -2.5 -1.4 -4.3*
(-2.1) (-1.0) (-0.9) (-2.9)
The table shows median quarterly growth rates for raw material, work in progress,
and finished goods inventory. To account for long-term growth trend, the aver-
age inventory growth rate is deducted from quarterly growth rates. The aver-
age inventory growth rate is calculated across all firm quarter observations. Posi-
tive (negative) values for inventory growth rate above average denote buildup (re-
duction) of excess inventory. Student’s t-test is employed to test for difference
from zero. The values in brackets denote test statistics. The stars ***, **,
* indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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tude of inventory growth in the first quarter of 13.8% suggests that merging companies do
face challenges on the supplier side during the post-merger integration. This may include
disruptions from changing suppliers or conflicts of interests that lead to a dis-continuity
of relationships with key suppliers.
Work in progress inventory growth rates range between 0.4% and 4.0% before the merger.
The growth rate peaks in Q1 at 9.9%. Testing the inventory growth rate above long-term
average for difference to zero, the effect is found to be significant at the 10% level. A
similar, but smaller effect is observed in Q3, when the growth rate goes up to 6.8%. In the
following quarters the growth rate ranges between -1.9% and 3.5%. The inventory build-
up in work in progress inventory supports hypothesis 4b. The merger seems to create
a fundamental change in the operations of many merging companies that necessitates
higher inventory. Such changes may include decreases of production reliability due to a
new operating system or a restructured production network. Bottlenecks in production
can occur when companies are able to grow their business to the capacity limits or when
the merger is driven by the motive to decrease production capacity. An extension of the
product portfolio may require to hold on stock a larger variety of intermediate products.
In the quarters before the merger and in the second year after the merger, the average
inventory growth rate stays at relevant constant levels and mostly ranges between 0.4%
and 4.0%. In the year after the merger, the growth rate varies peaking at 9.9% in the
first quarter, dropping to 0.2%, soaring up to 6.8% and dropping again to -0.3%. The
variation may be caused by the integration activities. The integration often includes re-
organization of the workforce, restructuring of the production footprint, and reallocation
of warehouses and distribution centers which are likely to cause disruptions. Inventory
management could be used to temporarily buffer the disruptions and mitigate any adverse
effects.
Table 9 shows that finished goods grow at rates between 2.1% and 12.3% before the
merger. There is a peak in the first quarter, when the growth rates shoots up to 8.2%.
The inventory build-up is reverted in the following quarters. In the second quarter, the
growth rate is -3.0%. In all following quarters except for Q5, the inventory growth rate is
below the long-term average of 3.0%. Hypothesis 4c is rejected as the inventory build-up
is reverted in the following quarters.
This analysis may contradict the findings from table 8 which shows quarterly inventory
responsiveness. The table and the respective analysis in hypothesis 3 show that revenue
growth is a key contributor to inventory growth. In the second quarter after the merger,
inventory growth of 6.9% can be explained by similarly high revenue growth of 5.2%.
When companies anticipate revenue growth, the first place to increase inventory should
be finished goods as they are closest to the customers. This is no the case in 9. To
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validate the findings from hypothesis 3, I replicate the table with quarterly inventory re-
sponsiveness for the sub-sample of 58 companies that report decomposed inventory. The
result in table 16 shows that revenue growth does not explain inventory build-up for the
companies in the sub-sample. The inventory growth rate peaks in the first quarter at
8.1%. Revenue growth is negative at -2.2% can not account for the inventory growth.
In the following quarters, inventory and revenue growth are closely aligned as should be
expected. However, there is no further notable peak in inventory growth. The growth
rate ranges between -2.6% and 3.4% in the following quarters. This confirms the contra-
diction to the analysis in table 8. This may be because inventory management is more
important for companies that report detailed inventory decomposition. It is likely to be
more relevant for their business and shareholders are likely to follow its development more
closely. Therefore, the companies in the sub-sample may have superior capabilities and a
stronger interest to revert the inventory build-up effect after the merger.
The decomposition of inventory shows that operational changes are likely to be a reason
for companies to build up inventory after an acquisition. The build-up in work in progress
inventory suggests that these changes could include restructuring of production network,
increase of capacity utilization or an increase in the number of intermediate products. The
build-up of raw material inventory may also be part of the explanation. Although the
effect is not significant, the increase of raw material by 13.8% in the first quarter suggests
that some companies face challenges with changing to new suppliers or with maintaining
key supplier relationships. For the companies in this sub-sample, revenue growth can not
account for inventory growth. This may be due to small sample size and to the important
role that inventory management plays for companies in the sub-sample.
Summarizing the findings for the third research question, revenue growth and operational
changes are likely to be key drivers for the inventory build-up. Table 8 shows that in some
quarters, inventory growth is driven by higher revenue growth. And table 16 exhibits that
for the sub-sample of companies that report inventory types, operational changes drive the
build-up in work in progress inventory. Table 6 demonstrates that the inventory build-up
is persistent over time and disruptions during the post-merger integration are unlikely to
be the reason for the inventory build-up.
The fourth research question addresses which company characteristics explain changes in
inventory. Understanding company characteristics associated with inventory build-up is
relevant for merging companies to assess to what extent the may have to create addi-
tional inventory. The analyzed company characteristics include gross margin, inventory
turnover, capital intensity, size of the acquiring and size of the target company. The rela-
tion of the company characteristics to inventory build-up is assessed through a regression
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Table 10: Pearson correlation matrix
Gross
margin
Inventory
turnover
Capital
intensity
ln acquirer size ln target size
Gross margin 1.000
Inventory turnover -0.233 1.000
Capital intensity -0.451 0.101 1.000
ln acquirer size 0.125 -0.082 -0.087 1.000
ln target size -0.010 0.053 -0.090 0.161 1.000
The table shows a Pearson correlation matrix for explanatory variables employed in the
regression analysis. ***, **, * indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
analysis. Table 10 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for explanatory variables. None
of the variables are correlated with each other at significant levels.
Gross margin is negatively correlated with inventory turnover with a correlation coefficient
of -0.233. Comparing to the formulation of hypothesis 5a and 5b, a negative relationship
between the two variables was to be expected: Companies face a strategic choice whether
to focus on generating a high profit margin through a premium offering or to maximize
sales through high volumes and thus high inventory turnover. Gross margin is negatively
correlated with capital intensity at -0.451. This relationship may be surprising. Com-
panies that have invested into their asset base should be able to earn higher margins to
account for their investment.
The relationship between the natural logarithm of acquirer size and the natural logarithm
of target size is noteworthy with a correlation coefficient of 0.161. The positive correla-
tion coefficient implies that bigger acquiring firms tend to aim for dis-proportionally larger
targets. This could be explained by the special set of capabilities required to integrate a
major acquisition. Smaller companies may therefore prefer proportionally smaller targets,
such as in bolt-on acquisitions.
Table 11 shows a regression analysis with the dependent variables cumulative average
growth rate for inventory and for inventory responsiveness. The Hypothesis column in-
dicates the expected relationship for each explanatory variable based on the hypotheses
defined in section 3. Despite the low correlation values in table 10, potential multi-
collinearity issues could arise. Several variables are derived from the same accounting
metrics including revenue, inventory and costs of goods sold. Therefore, variables that
are based on same accounting metrics are not used in the same regression model.
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Hypothesis 5a states that the expected relationship for gross margin and inventory growth
is negative. The argument is that companies earning higher gross margins often have
developed more resilient supply chain and inventory management practices. I argue that
they are able to utilize superior production planning tools and develop better foresight
into customer needs, instead of increasing inventory to deliver on the value proposition.
Regression model 1 shows that gross margin is negatively correlated with inventory build-
up with a regression coefficient of -2.898. Although the relationship is not significant,
the analysis supports hypothesis 5a. Higher gross margins are negatively correlated with
inventory build-up. This result also holds true for regression model 2. The metric for
inventory build-up has been replaced by the cumulative average growth rate of inventory
responsiveness (IR CAGR). The dependent variable reflects only the increase in inventory
in the four quarters after the merger that can not be explained by higher revenue. The
regression coefficient is -0.837. The effect of gross margin on inventory build-up in this
case is negative, but smaller than in regression model 1.
Companies with high inventory turnover often pursue a strategy to maximize profits
through high volumes in a low margin business. Hypothesis 5b argues that the effect
of adverse changes like disruptions or less efficient inventory practices is magnified by
high volumes, thus increasing the impact to the inventory position. Such adverse changes
are likely to occur during the post-merger integration period. For instance, the analysis
of decomposed inventory based on table 9 suggests that changes in the production and
supply chain setup are likely to contribute to the inventory build-up. Regression model 3
analyses the relationship of inventory turnover, target size and acquirer size to the mea-
sure of inventory build-up in the four quarters after a merger. The regression coefficient
for inventory turnover is is 0.313 with a significance level of 10%. In regression model
5, acquirer and target size are replaced by capital intensity. It generates similar results.
The regression coefficient for inventory turnover is is 0.298 with a significance level of
10%. Hypothesis 5b is accepted. Acquiring companies need to expect higher inventory
build-up when they intend to increase inventory turnover as a result of the merger. 4
shows that the mean company has an inventory turnover of 2.3. For an increase of the
inventory turnover to 2.5, we expect additional inventory build-up of 0.2%. Assuming
mean inventory of $ 837.9 million yields a negative financial impact of $ 1.9 million. The
effect of inventory turnover on inventory build-up vanishes in regression models 4 and 6.
In these regression models, the dependent variable expresses the inventory growth in the
four quarters after the merger that excesses revenue growth. The regression coefficients
are -0.030 and 0.008 respectively. This may be because the phenomenon is smaller as
revenue growth accounts for a substantial share of inventory growth.
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Table 11: Regression on cumulative average inventory growth rate in Q1 - Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Inv.
CAGR
IR
CAGR
Inv.
CAGR
IR
CAGR
Inv.
CAGR
IR
CAGR
Hypo-
thesis
Gross margin -2.898 -0.837 5a (-)
(Revenue-COGS)/Revenue (2.411) (1.665)
Inventory turnover 0.313* -0.030 0.298* 0.008 5b (+)
COGS over Inventory (0.186) (0.129) (0.181) (0.121)
Capital intensity -0.158 -0.257 5c (-)
Assets over Revenue (0.156) (0.156)
Acquirer size -0.120 -0.449** -0.097 -0.459** 5d (-)
ln of mean Assets (0.304) (0.222) (0.299) (0.219)
Target size -0.758***0.187 -0.774***0.195 5e (-)
ln of mean Assets (0.223) (0.167) (0.220) (0.166)
Time dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 926 926 926 926 926 926
R2 0.085 0.059 0.089 0.059 0.076 0.055
The table shows least square dummy variable regressions. The dependent variable in re-
gression models 1, 3 and 5 is the cumulative average growth rate of inventory in the four
quarters after the merger (Inv. CAGR). For regression models 2, 4 and 6 the dependent
variable is based on the same logic but inventory growth is adjusted for revenue growth
(IR CAGR). The last column shows for each variable the number and expected direction
of the corresponding hypothesis. The values in brackets denote t-statistics and starts
***, **, * indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Hypothesis 5c assesses the relationship of capital intensity to post-merger inventory de-
velopment. Capital intensity is measured as assets over revenue to reflect the amount of
investments required from a company to generate its revenues. The hypothesis argues
that high investments are likely to result in superior infrastructure that provide the tools
to avoid the need for significant inventory build-ups. Regression model 5 shows that the
relationship of capital intensity and inventory build-up is negative. The regression co-
efficient is -0.158. While the result is not significant, it lends support to hypothesis 5c.
Companies with a high ratio of assets to revenue create less new inventory after a merger.
The result holds for regression model 6, in which the dependent variable is replaced by a
measure that accounts for revenue growth.
Hypothesis 5d puts forward that larger acquiring companies are associated with lower
inventory build-up. My rationale is that larger companies have better capabilities. Such
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capabilities may include advanced analytics, superior tools for inventory management and
more manpower to staff the post-merger integration. Larger companies are also more likely
to be serial acquirers. Hayward (2002) shows that serial acquirers are able to learn from
their mistakes and on average can achieve better M&A performance. Regression models
1, 2, 3 and 4 show that larger acquiring companies on average create lower inventory. In
regression models 1 and 3 the dependent variable is inventory growth. Acquirer size has
a negative but small correlation with inventory build-ups. In regression models 2 and 4
the dependent variable is the cumulative average growth rate for inventory responsiveness
(IR CAGR). Now the regression coefficient is at -0.449 and -0.459 respectively. The effect
is bigger and significant at the 5% level. These findings give support to hypothesis 5d.
However, the relationship of acquirer size to inventory growth in regression models 1 and
3 is not significant.
Hypothesis 5e states that smaller target companies are associated with higher inventory
build-ups. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) find that smaller targets are likely to receive
less management attention. After the deal is closed, top management attention may divert
and the integration is carried out with less rigor and control. I argue that this may affect
negatively on inventory development. Regression models 1 and 3 analyze the relationship
of target size and inventory growth. The regression coefficients are -0.758 and -0.774 re-
spectively. The relationship is negative and significant at the 1% level. Hypothesis 5e is
accepted. Smaller targets on average require higher inventory build-up. When choosing a
50% larger target the acquiring company can expect a 0.3%-points smaller cumulative av-
erage growth rate of inventory in the first year after the merger. For the median company
holding $ 837.9 million in inventory before the merger, this implies $ 2.5 million lower
inventory build-up. The magnitude of this effect may cause managers to reconsider how
they set priorities. This finding does not hold when adjusting the dependent variable for
revenue growth. In regression models 2 and 4, the relationship for target size is positive
with a regression coefficient of 0.187 and 0.195 respectively.
Table 12 shows the inventory development for a sub-sample of 71 wholesales and 99
retail companies. Trade companies are interesting subjects because efficient inventory
management is often a competitive factor for many companies in the industry. Trade
companies often hold inventory to fulfill their function of relocating and distributing goods
into smaller cargo sizes, bringing the product into closer proximity of the customer and
improving accessibility. The important role of inventory for trade companies is reflected
in higher average inventory levels. Table 12 shows that wholesale companies hold average
inventory of $ 340.6 million before the merger. For retail the average is even at $ 403.4
million. In contrast, companies in the full sample of 926 companies hold $ 287.0 million
in inventory. Table 3 shows that in particular general merchandise stores that engage in
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Table 12: Average inventory levels before and after merger in segments of trade industry,
$ million
Wholesale (SIC codes 5000-5199) Retail (SIC code 5200-5999)
No.
of
obs.
Median
inventory
level
Invetory
above
pre-deal
median
% of
pre-deal
median
No.
of
obs.
Median
inventory
level
Invetory
above
pre-deal
median
% of
pre-deal
median
Average q-4 - q-1 71 340.6 0.0 0.0 99 403.4 0.0 0.0
Average Q1 - Q4 71 386.9 61.8*** 28.6 99 428.2 46.5*** 19.9
(4.4) (5.3)
Average Q5 - Q8 71 389.4 79.4*** 30.6 99 470.0 66.6*** 29.9
(5.8) (5.8)
The table shows the development of inventory levels for the two segments in the trade in-
dustry: wholesale and retail. Either acquiring or target firm belong to the industries accord-
ing to their two-digit SIC code. The average q-4 - q-1 is calculated as the average of me-
dians of the pro-forma combined acquiring and target firm. Similarly, averages Q1- Q4 and
Q5 - Q8 denote the averages of the firm’s median inventory. To test for difference from zero,
Wilcoxon sign-rank test is employed. The values in brackets denote test statistic and the
stars ***, **, * indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
acquisitions hold high inventory levels with a median average of $ 2755.6 million.
The inventory build-up phenomenon is especially distinct for trade companies. Table
6 shows that the median average inventory build-up in the full sample is 12.9% in the
first year and 21.2% in the second year after the acquisition. For retailers, the effect is
stronger as they reach 19.9% already in the first year and even 29.9% in the second year.
For wholesale companies, the size of the inventory build-up is similar. However, it occurs
a lot faster as merging companies build-up 28.6% more inventory already in the first year
and stay relatively stable in the second year at 30.6%. At the first look, this finding may
be surprising as high inventory levels and strategic importance of inventory management
in trade companies should offer higher optimization potential. Waller, Johnson and Davis
(1999) gave vendor managed inventory (VMI) as an example of inventory improvements
in retail supply chains. And Chen, Frank and Wu (2007) showed that inventory in the
wholesale and retail industries became leaner in the period 1987-2000. However, trade
companies may have stronger incentives to build-up inventory when they fear negative
consequences from operational disturbances. Finley and Bonno (2012) gave poor quality
and stock-outs as examples for negative consequences. Trading companies often sell to end
customer which may be concerned that a focus on savings in the merger integration may
come at the cost of service quality. The customer relationship may be more transactional
which lowers barriers for switching to competitors. To ensure deliveries and customer
satisfaction, trading companies may decide to build-up above average inventory levels.
Table 13 summarizes the results and implications for each hypothesis.
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Table 13: Summary of results
No Hypothesis Result Implication
1 Post-acquisition inventory is signifi-
cantly higher than pre-acquisition in-
ventory.
Accepted The phenomenon of inventory
build-up after mergers exists.
2 The average inventory levels of merg-
ing companies are significantly higher
in the second year after the merger
compared to the year before the
merger.
Accepted The inventory build-up is not a
temporary phenomenon, but is
driven by fundamental and long-
term changes in the business.
3 Merging companies grow revenue at
similar rates as inventory in the quar-
ters following an acquisition.
Accepted The inventory build-up is par-
tially driven by revenue growth.
4a The inventory build-up occurs in raw
material inventory.
SupportedThe increase in raw material in-
ventory is statistically not signif-
icant.
4b The inventory build-up occurs in work
in progress inventory.
Accepted The build-up in work in progress
inventory indicates a fundamen-
tal change in production and
supply chain setup.
4c The inventory build-up occurs in fin-
ished goods inventory.
Rejected For the sub-sample, inventory
build-up is not driven by revenue
growth.
5a Gross margin is negatively correlated
with the build-up of above average in-
ventory.
SupportedCompanies operating in a high
margin segment build-up less in-
ventory.
5b Inventory turnover is positively corre-
lated with the build-up of above aver-
age inventory.
Accepted Adverse changes in inventory
management have a stronger im-
pact to companies with high in-
ventory turnover.
5c Capital intensity is negatively corre-
lated with build-up of above average
inventory.
SupportedHigh rate of investments may
create tools that reduce the need
for inventory build-ups
5d The size of acquiring company is neg-
atively correlated with the build-up of
above average inventory.
SupportedLarger companies may have su-
perior capabilities in deal mak-
ing and integration.
5e The size of target company is nega-
tively correlated with the build-up of
above average inventory.
Accepted Small targets are likely to receive
less management attention lead-
ing to higher inventory build-up.
The result column indicates whether the hypothesis is accepted, rejected or not sup-
ported. Not supported is used when the evidence indicates that the hypothesis may be
right, however, it is not sufficient to accept the hypothesis and further research should
be conducted. The implication columns repeats in short the conclusion from the analysis
in the results section.
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6 Conclusion
This study establishes a novel phenomenon as merging companies experience a inventory
build-up during the post-merger integration period. Average inventory levels in the year
after the merger are $99.4 million or 21.6% above pre-merger averages. This phenomenon
is surprising, as decision makers frequently expect to reduce inventory. The inventory
build-up persists throughout the second year after the merger. I conclude that the inven-
tory build-up is driven by fundamental changes rather than a temporary need to buffer
disturbances during post-merger integration.
The inventory build-up happens in the first and second quarter after the merger. Inven-
tory growth of merging companies peaks at 7.9% in the first and at 6.9% in the second
quarter after the merger. These growth rates are above the long-term average of 4.1% at
statistical significant levels. The timing of the build-up suggests a strong link to post-
merger integration as the cause for the phenomenon.
The inventory build-up is partially caused by revenue growth. In the first quarter after
the merger, revenue growth is at -0.8% and can not explain inventory growth at 7.9%.
However, in the second quarter after the merger, 5.2% revenue growth is the main driver
for inventory growth of 6.9%. This observation appear intuitive as merging companies
often intend to create revenue synergies by moving into new geographies, market segments
or product offerings.
I find that work in progress and raw material inventory are strongly affected by M&A
activity. For the sub-sample of 58 companies that report decomposed inventory, work in
progress inventory grows by 9.9% and raw material grows 13.8% in the first quarter. This
suggests that many merging companies experience fundamental changes in the production
and supplier setup that create additional inventory needs. Such changes may include the
creation of bottlenecks in production through higher volumes or through close downs. An
extension of the product portfolio may require to store a larger variety of intermediate
products. Although the effect on raw material inventory is not statistically significant,
companies seem to face challenges when changing suppliers to gain synergies or when
maintaining relationship with key suppliers.
Deals that involve smaller target companies tend to result in higher inventory build-ups.
Management attention may divert easily from smaller targets as they have less signifi-
cance for the company. Less support and pressure from management may lead to lower
performance in the post-merger integration including higher inventory levels. Companies
with higher inventory turnover are likely to build up more inventory. Companies with
higher inventory turnover typically operate in high volume businesses. High volumes can
magnify adverse effects to inventory management resulting in higher inventory build-ups.
Acquirer size exhibits a negative and significant relation to inventory build-up when ad-
justing inventory growth for revenue growth. Larger acquiring companies appear to have
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superior capabilities and resources to manage and integrate their acquisitions. In addition,
I find that companies in retail and trade industries experience above average inventory
build-ups.
The main contribution of this study is to establish that merging companies build-up
inventory and to respond to the key questions when, how and why the inventory build-up
occurs. The results have important implications for deal decision making and post-merger
integration. Synergy estimates are frequently based on the assumption that inventory
levels can be reduced after the merger. Too high synergy estimates will be factored into
the premium leading the acquiring company to pay a too high premium. The magnitude
of the inventory build-up can easily account for 6.1% of the deal value as illustrated in
table 14. I compare a conservative scenario for expected inventory development to the
actual inventory growth rates based on table 7. Taking the difference and discounting
it to the merger date yields an implicit deal premium of $ 86.8 million or 6.1% of the
average deal value.
Unrealistic expectations in the inventory development can affect post-merger integration
when companies focus on the wrong actions. Integration planning may reckon with re-
ductions of inventory and initiate actions accordingly. However, actions in the opposite
direction might be what is really needed. When inventory piles up in the first and second
quarter after the merger, supply chain management needs to ensure that the warehouses
and infrastructure scale up accordingly. If planning does not account for higher inven-
tory needs, the company risks stock outs of critical stock keeping units which may affect
customer deliveries.
A final implication of this study is that supply chains matter for merger success. Al-
though supply chain considerations are rarely the reason to commence a merger, they are
essential to make the deal work. Unfortunately the topic is often left out of the CEO level
agenda because it is considered too operational and detailed. This study gives a hands-on
example that illustrates that detailed understanding of the value creation mechanism is
needed. The inventory build-up is partially driven by revenue growth which implies that
the ability to reduce inventory is limited by revenue growth. Without the understanding
how much additional inventory is needed to support revenue growth, estimates for future
inventory needs can go awfully wrong. Therefore, early involvement of supply chain ex-
perts in the merger process is important. A strong role of supply chain management has
also been promoted by Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005), Finley and Bonno (2012) and
Tompkins (2012).
My study has important limitations. The research design is based financial reporting data
which limits the depth and understanding of interconnections. Future research should
consider alternative data sources. For instance, management accounting shows inventory
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Table 14: Inventory build-up as an implicit premium paid on top of deal value
Unit of
measurement
Before
merger
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Panel A: Expected inventory development of merging firms
$ million 837.9 863.0 888.9 915.6 943.1 971.4 1000.5 1030.5 1061.4
%-growth 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Panel B: Actual inventory development of merging firms
$ million 837.9 904.0 966.7 1005.0 1041.0 1064.3 1100.4 1116.8 1148.8
%-growth 7.9% 6.9% 4.0% 3.6% 2.2% 3.4% 1.5% 2.9%
Panel C: Difference of actual and expected inventory development
$ million 0.0 41.0 36.8 11.7 8.5 -5.0 6.9 -13.6 1.0
discounted to Q0 0.0 40.8 36.4 11.6 8.4 -4.9 6.8 -13.2 1.0
Cost of inventory build-up $ 86.8 million
in percentage of deal value 6.1%
Mean average deal value $ 1428.9 million
This table estimates the cash flow impact of expected and actual inventory development
for an average firm in the sample. Panel A shows a scenario for expected inventory de-
velopment assuming 3.0% growth per quarter. This is a conservative assumption as the
long-term average inventory growth in the sample lies at 4.1%. The starting inventory
level $ 837.9 million is based on the average inventory levels before mergers, as denoted
in table 6. Panel B shows the actual inventory development with growth rates based
on table 7. Panel C estimates the net present value of the difference in expected and
actual inventory. The discount rate is based on average cost of capital 6.9%, following
Damodaran (2014).
development by stock keeping units across geographies and business units. More detailed
data enables the analysis of interesting questions. For instance, the inventory build-up
could primarily occur for products of the target company when those are made available
in the larger distribution network of the acquiring company. Post-merger revenue growth
may necessitate over-proportional creation of inventory when new customers are located
remotely or have extraordinary expectations into service levels.
Interviews and surveys targeted at key decision makers and stakeholders can improve the
understanding for the interconnections in inventory management after mergers. The effect
of a restructuring in the production and distribution networks on inventory development
is rarely considered thoroughly but may be an important obstacles when the operations
are not able to scale to the new setup. The decision to stock up inventory may be caused
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by the management’s risk aversion or by its inability to maintain tight control of inventory
levels of the new organization.
This study is limited to the invenotry build-up as one specific area of supply chain man-
agement. Future research should also investigate the role of supply chain management
in M&A on a broader scale. Herd, Saksena and Steger (2005) and Finley and Bonno
(2012) proposed a supply chain centric approach that involves early involvement of sup-
ply chain leaders in developing the deal rationale, verifying its potential and preparing
post-merger integration. Sagner (2012) argued that inventory and receivables could serve
as an early indicator for merger success that should be thoroughly analyzed in the due
diligence. Reese (2007) highlighted data challenges in supply chain that may lead to poor
decision making when being ignored. Singh (2009) saw a fundamental problem in the ex-
tensive focus on short-term cost savings in the supply chain integration. Typical actions
like shut-downs and labor reductions result in supply chain disruptions that are detri-
mental to achieving the merger targets. Instead, post-merger integration should focus
on delivering sustainable benefits from combining product offerings and joint production
of intermediary components. The cited practitioner articles convey two important mes-
sages. First, there are many great ideas in the supply chain area that can make mergers
more successful. Academic research should take a pro-active role in verifying and pro-
moting these ideas. Second, there are so many and innovative ideas that companies are
not able to tell which ones apply to their situation other than through trial and error.
Academic research can make an important contribution by developing new methodologies
that structure the ideas and identify clear use cases for different approaches.
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7 Appendix
Table 15: Data availability and sample size by industry of the target firm
Retrieved
from SDC
database
Acquirer
data
available
Target
data
available
Data
available
for both
Deals
included in
sample
% of total
in sample
Mining and Construction 274 115 159 71 59 6.4
Proess manufacturing 471 342 334 244 224 24.2
High tech manufacturing 1082 806 718 534 499 53.9
Transport and Utilities 416 181 263 119 0 0.0
Trade 350 236 233 159 144 15.6
Services 996 358 585 217 0 0.0
Public Administration 1 1 1 1 0 0.0
Total 3590 2039 2293 1345 926 100.0
The table shows the number of deals by industry of the target firm, based on one-digit SIC
codes. Deals were excluded from the original sample due to missing data for the acquiring or
target firm. In addition, deals with firms in the service, and transport and utilities industries
were excluded because inventory does not play a significant role for them.
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Table 16: Inventory responsiveness, quarter over quarter for companies in sub-sample
that report inventory decomposition
Means of all firms
Quarter
relative
to merger
Inventory
growth rate
Revenue
growth rate
Inventory
responsiveness
Inventory
resonsiveness
above average
Number
of deals 58 58 58 58
q 4 3.32 4.67 -1.35 -1.93
(-1.48)
q 3 2.13 0.90 1.23 0.65
(0.44)
q 2 3.62 2.32 1.30 0.72
(0.28)
q 1 2.84 -1.40 4.24 3.66
(1.51)
Q0 3.92 1.87 2.05 1.47
(0.65)
Q1 8.09 -2.20 10.29 9.71**
(2.28)
Q2 -2.61 -1.34 -1.26 -1.84
(-0.62)
Q3 3.42 3.12 0.30 -0.28
(-0.10)
Q4 -0.21 3.86 -4.07 -4.65**
(-2.02)
Q5 1.54 0.49 1.05 0.47
(0.25)
Q6 -0.20 1.00 -1.20 -1.78
(-0.69)
Q7 -0.36 2.85 -3.21 -3.79
(-0.76)
Q8 -0.28 1.55 -1.82 -2.40
(-1.12)
Inventory responsiveness is calculated as inventory growth rate less revenue growth
rate. The average inventory growth rate is calculated across all firm quarter ob-
servations. Positive values for inventory responsiveness mean that inventory grows
faster than revenue. To account for long-term growth trend, the average inven-
tory responsiveness is deducted from quarterly values. The average inventory growth
rate is calculated across all firm quarter observations. Positive (negative) val-
ues for inventory responsiveness above average denote buildup (reduction) of ex-
cess inventory. To test for difference from zero, Student’s t-test for means are
employed. The values in brackets denote test statistics. The stars ***, **,
* indicate a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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